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Europeans can be proud as they look back on fifty years of peaceful integration. Nowa-
days many people worldwide see the European Union as a model of how states and their 
citizens can work together in peace and freedom. However, this achievement does not 
automatically mean that the EU has the ability to deal with the problems of the future 
in a rapidly changing world. The European Union must continue developing its unity in 
diversity dynamically, be it with regard to energy issues, the euro, climate change or new 
types of conflict. Indeed, self-assertion and solidarity are key to the debates shaping our 
future.
 
“Europe in Dialogue“ wishes to make a contribution to these open debates. The analy-
ses in this series subject political concepts, processes and institutions to critical scrutiny 
and suggest ways of reforming internal and external European policymaking so that it 
is fit for the future. However, “Europe in Dialogue“ is not merely trying to encourage 
an intra-European debate and makes a point of including authors from non-EU states. 
Looking at an issue from different angle or from afar creates a shift in perspective which, 
in turn, renders Europe‘s development more meaningful as it engages in critical dialogue 
with other societies.
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How successful are OECD countries in achieving 
sustainable policy outcomes? How effectively do 
governments in these countries steer change, and 
to what extent do they engage civil society in the 
process? In answering these questions, the 2011 
edition of the Sustainable Governance Indicators 
(SGI) aims to foster good governance and sustai-
nable policy outcomes in the OECD by encoura-
ging institutional learning through an exchange 
of best practices. The authors argue that national 
governments still have a considerably broad cope 
of action in facing upcoming challenges.
Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.)
Sustainable Governance Indicators 2011
Policy Performance and Governance Capacities in the OECD 
“To improve governance, it is indispensable to learn from experience. With its qualitative analysis of transforma-
tion processes in 128 developing and transition countries, the BTI provides a valuable resource for understanding 
better the successes and failures of political management. Its actor-centered approach identifies a diverse set 
of strategies in how to get the job done. The BTI is an outstanding instrument for policy learning and should 
be consulted by policymakers worldwide who are struggling with the challenge of building sustainable and 
thriving democracies.”
The Right Honourable Kim Campbell, P.C., C.C., Q.C., former Prime Minister of Canada, Paris/Vancouver
 
“Scores from the BTI have been used as a data source for Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index since 2007. Thanks to its rigorous methodology, which draws on local expert sources validated through a 
centralized peer-review process, the BTI has proven itself to be an excellent source that captures cross-national 
comparisons of perceptions of corruption. The substantive qualitative detail accompanying each score enhances 
the legitimacy and usefulness of the data.”
Peter Eigen, Founder of Transparency International & Chairman of Transparency International’s advisory council, Berlin
 
“The BTI identifies the rule of law and socially balanced market economic reforms as clear priorities in sustain-
able development. It therefore serves as a good reference for German organizations engaged in international 
cooperation. The detailed reports combined with comparative evaluations allow us to contextualize political-
institutional frameworks in our partner countries and provide more effective, tailored support to our partners 
in the sustainable implementation of key reforms.”
Christoph Beier, Managing Director, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Eschborn/Bonn
 
“The BTI is one of the sources of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance because it provides in-depth expert 
assessments in many thematic areas for which the available data concerning Africa is not robust or comprehen-
sive enough. The BTI´s numerical assessments are based on detailed country reports that clearly show the origin 
and reason for each and every score. Thus, the BTI allows the Ibrahim Index research team to check, compare 
and draw conclusions from the wealth of information provided.”
Nathalie Delapalme, Director of Research and Policy, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, London
 
“The BTI is one of the most sophisticated international ranking instruments focusing on transitional countries’ 
success in establishing democratic political systems and market economies. While we might (and should) continue 
to discuss methodological refinements and the often varying interpretations of its findings, the BTI should be a 
standard reference tool for all students of global economic, social and political transformations.”
Andrei Y. Melville, Dean of the Faculty of Politics, Higher School of Economics, Moscow
www.bti-project.org
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Discover the world of transformation
The interactive Transformation Atlas is an innovative tool that helps users explore 
the entirety of the BTI‘s extensive data set. An engaging presentation of information 
and intuitive navigation structure provide users easy access to the BTI‘s key fi ndings 
and allow them to identify patterns and correlations without compromising the 
complexity of the data.  
www.bti-project.org/atlas
The Transformation Atlas provides:
· access to 6,656 individual scores for the BTI 2012;
· a broad set of data from previous BTI editions;
· each score‘s underlying in-depth qualitative analysis; 
· new insights through modern data presentation;
· illustration export functions for users who want to 
 integrate these into their own presentations.
Transformation Atlas users choose their own point of entry into the data set. User 
interest guides exploration, whether this be through global comparison, an in-depth 
case study, a time-series comparison or an extensive correlation analysis.  
Transformation Index BTI 2012
Political Management in International Comparison
Bertelsmann Stiftung (ed.)
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Advocating reforms targeting the goal of a con-
stitutional democracy and socially responsible 
market economy, the Transformation Index BTI 
provides the framework for an exchange of best 
practices among agents of reform. Within this 
framework, the BTI publishes two rankings, the 
Status Index and the Management Index, both of 
which are based on in-depth assessments of 128 
countries.
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 Just over a year ago, a wave of political upheaval began in Europe’s southern 
neighborhood that shook the power structures throughout the region. In 
those authoritarian countries, in which until then, any form of opposition 
opinion or protest had been strictly prohibited, masses of people took to the 
streets and demanded greater political and economic participation, better 
governance and the civil rights denied them for decades. For Europe, these 
demonstrations of individual courage, collective determination and political 
progress signified and continue to signify that, for the first time, realistic 
prospects for a democratically governed Mediterranean region are in the 
making. For this reason, the significance of the sociopolitical transformation in 
the North African and Middle Eastern countries can be compared to that of 
the democratization processes in Eastern Europe – 2011 joins 1989 as a date 
of historical import, this time for the peoples of the Arab world, but again for 
Europe as well.  
Thus, with the current volume, we would like to offer an interim appraisal: 
from a stock-taking of last year’s political developments and an analysis of the 
current transformation dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa, to the 
prospects for stronger and overall better Arab-European cooperation. For a 
series of publications bearing the title “Europe in Dialogue,” one set of 
questions takes on particular urgency: More than a year after the inception of 
the transformation processes, who among our southern neighbors are 
emerging as (possibly new) partners in dialogue? Which developments in the 
Mediterranean region can be expected and demand our special attention? And 
closer to home, how advanced is Europe’s own capability to engage in 
dialogue with the Arab world?  
This set of questions is closely related to the issue of political learning in 
times of rapid and radical change. The rulers in Arab countries weren’t alone 
in being unprepared by the force of the mass political protests. European 
media and academics too proved unable to foresee social upheavals of such 
considerable scope, at least with any accuracy. Even the Bertelsmann 
Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) – which for 10 years has regularly 
analyzed political and economic change toward democracy under the rule of 
law and a socially responsible market economy in 128 developing and 
transformation countries, while also assessing and comparing the steering 
capability of the countries’ political elites – is in this case no exception. The 
BTI country reports on the Middle East and North Africa contained no 
prophetic scenarios describing the course of the protests and the toppling of 
dictators with any precision. 
The advantage BTI reports of previous editions have held over all short-
term political analysis, however, was a research-grounded account of the 
political, economic and social causes that led to the events of 2011, from the 
increasing political repression and the growing gap between poor and rich, to 
the lack of opportunity that for a growing proportion of young people in Arab 
countries became increasingly difficult to bear. Particularly in the North 
African states, the Transformation Index’s analysis showed that the pressure 
associated with these problems had been steadily growing. What appeared as a 
sudden upheaval had, in fact, a long history, described in detail in the BTI 
country reports.  
A particularly important part of this previous history is the immediate eve of 
the “Arab Spring,” chronicled by the 40 experts that worked on the 
preparation of the BTI 2012 country reports for the Arab world. The deadline 
for the drafts of the 19 reports from the Middle East and North Africa was 
the end of January 2011 – thus, exactly the point at which Tunisia and Egypt 
found themselves in the initial stages of a radical change, which in turn 
triggered an unforeseeable change in the dynamics of the entire region. As a 
result, the Transformation Index published in March 2012 highlights the 
whole spectrum of stalled reforms and policy failures, corruption and 
repression, impoverishment and lack of opportunity that ultimately led to the 
outbreak of political protest and to the resignation of dictators that had held 
seemingly impregnable positions. 
 Here it proves to be an invaluable advantage that the BTI is not limited to a 
single issue such as the extent of corruption, or to a single research dimension 
such as the scope of political freedoms. Rather, the Transformation Index 
comprehensively examines the political, economic and social aspects of 
transformation, and also offers an in-depth presentation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each country’s political management. The protest by young 
demonstrators on the streets of Tunis and Cairo against political paternalism 
and arbitrariness cannot be separated from the explosive social mixture of 
unequal income distribution, rampant corruption, high youth unemployment 
and a marked rural-urban divide. The decrepit political and economic 
structures in turn are largely attributable to the ruling elite’s hostility to reform 
and lack of learning capacity. All these facets of social development are 
examined in the BTI, with relations drawn between them. 
For this volume, BTI regional coordinator for the Middle East and North 
Africa Jan Völkel analyzes the last year’s political developments in the context 
of the BTI 2012’s country reports and findings. He delves into the antecedents 
of the outbreak of mass protest and democratization efforts in the spring of 
2011, and through a time-series comparison with the results of previous 
editions of the BTI draws a convincing portrait of social stagnation and 
despair, one which contains no fixed point of certain collapse, but outlines the 
urgent need for social change. In this analysis, he focuses primarily on the 
countries in which incumbent regimes have been shaken with particular 
strength: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. He succeeds not 
only in doing justice to the diverse and complex processes of change that 
affected these countries in the past year, but also in updating the BTI’s 
examination of this important region, and placing it in the context of current 
developments. We also offer a special thanks to Jan Völkel for his invaluable 
role in the conception and supervision of this volume. 
For many years, the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s transformation project has held 
that analysis of political and economic developments and of associated 
government performance must be accompanied by dialogue with local reform 
actors. Since almost half of the BTI’s nearly 250 country experts are drawn 
from the ranks of prominent scholars and experts in the countries studied, 
such dialogue for us represents more than the importance of gaining a local 
perspective. Indeed, considering the internal view of social change alongside a 
scientific analysis of governance is for us an essential goal; we thus strive for 
exchange with young political decision-makers from the realms of politics, 
academia, the media and other areas of civil society.  
To this end, in cooperation with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the Bertelsmann Stiftung has for nearly 
10 years conducted the “Transformation Thinkers” dialogue program. This 
has today grown into a network of almost 150 young leaders from all regions 
of the world, distinguished by sophisticated discussion driven by participants’ 
own leadership experiences. It is therefore a particular pleasure for us to have 
two Transformation Thinkers, Ibraham Hegazy and Salam Kawakibi, as 
authors in this volume. Both have belonged to our network for many years, 
and here contribute their impressions and personal experiences with social 
change in Egypt and Syria. They are joined by Amine Ghali, who participated 
as a guest speaker at the September 2011 Transformation Thinkers alumni 
conference, and provides an arresting description of his own initially high – 
but ultimately sobered –- estimation of Tunisia’s transition from dictatorship 
to democracy, in which he himself took on a role of significant responsibility. 
Elham Manea, who served as a country expert for the BTI 2012, offers in 
her contribution a stimulating mix of scholarly analysis and personal 
impressions of the political upheaval in Yemen, which continues to meet with 
a variety of particularly strong obstacles. Finally, Libyan journalist Samir 
Saadawi forcefully urges the West to look at the hopeful new beginning in his 
home country with a perspective broader than that of energy policy alone. We 
are particularly grateful to these five “regional voices” for their moving and 
inspiring essays; their vital contribution enables us to include perspectives 
from the Arab world itself, instead of simply writing “about” a region in 
upheaval.  
Eberhard Kienle, regional expert on the BTI board, the Transformation 
Index’s advisory panel, builds on Jan Völkel’s progress report and the 
experiences of the “regional voices,” undertaking an analysis of the current 
transformation dynamics in North Africa and the Middle East in order to 
evaluate the prospects for democratization. He expands on the focus of the 
previous contributions, including also those countries which to date have 
 shown no fundamental upheaval. With a special focus on Egypt and Tunisia, 
he depicts the essential actors and constellations of forces. His comprehensive 
and profound article examines the factors that favor or hinder the working of 
transformation processes, and discusses the prospects for better government 
leadership within the region, a question of critical interest to the region’s 
European neighbors as well.  
Tobias Schumacher, who as a former regional coordinator and current 
country expert has been a part of the BTI project for many years, concludes 
with a change of perspective, examining European perceptions of the Arab 
world’s transformation processes, as well as the political course set by the EU 
through the revision of its European Neighborhood policy. He comes to a 
skeptical assessment, indicating the limits of positive as well as negative 
conditionality by pointing out conflicts of interest, insufficient differentiation 
and limited opportunities for influence. He therefore warns strongly against 
the danger of Europe striking a heavy-handed normative position while 
ultimately pursuing a transparently self-interested course, as well as against 
offering a policy of rhetorical but toothless opposition to authoritarian 
regimes. His article instead offers a number of pragmatic approaches that 
would allow the EU to engage with the region’s transformation processes in a 
sophisticated and constructive way.  
We hope that with this volume, we can contribute to clarifying and adding 
nuance to the idea of the “Arab Spring,” a term both diffuse and often all too 
euphemistically used. Europe must develop a clearer picture of its southern 
neighbors if it wants to conceive the democratization and political upheaval in 
North Africa and the Middle East as an opportunity holding the potential to 
improve cooperation, rather than reacting with reflexive fears of instability or 
the influence of political Islam. Unlike the media, whose reports are driven by 
strongly fluctuating cycles of thematic interest, the BTI’s view will remain 
firmly fixed on the region. The dictators in Tunisia and Egypt have fallen. 
Protests lasted 18 days before Mubarak resigned. But the process of change 
that now stands before these two countries and many others in the region will 
be measured in years, not days. Whether and how this may lead to stable 
democracies is today unknown. As this becomes clearer in years to come, the 
BTI will continue to analyze the long road to democracy, and record whether 
citizens’ demands for a greater participatory role in politics and the economy 
are in fact being fulfilled. 
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 The events of 2011 surpassed the wildest expectations of the potential for 
political change in the Arab world. First, there were two surprisingly sudden 
resignations: Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali on January 14th 
(after a mere four weeks of demonstrations) and shortly afterwards, on 
February 11th, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (after demonstrations 
lasting about three weeks). Then, although the grueling back and forth 
between demonstrators and state security forces in Bahrain, Yemen, Libya and 
Syria had resulted in a form of deadlock, the expulsion of Muammar al-
Qadhafi, who had ruled Libya since 1969, from Tripoli on August 23rd gave 
rise to new hope: perhaps the democratic wave sweeping across the Arab 
world had not simply petered out somewhere in the desert, but could indeed 
reach and change other states. Finally, even Yemen’s President Ali Abdallah 
Salih was ousted on November 23rd; his departure for the United States via 
Oman in late January 2012 marked the de facto end of his reign, which had 
lasted since 1978.  
In fact, there is now, at the start of 2012, hardly a single country in the Arab 
world whose political system has remained untouched by the events of the last 
year. In Jordan, the government has changed. In Algeria, the state of 
emergency has been lifted. In Morocco the constitution has been altered. All 
in reaction to protests or pre-emptive moves against possible demonstrations. 
This new-found popular power is astonishing, particularly given that Arab 
regimes had previously been considered largely resistant to reform 
(Schlumberger 2007). Samuel Huntington’s 1991 book The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, which identified the era of political 
reforms that swept through southern Europe, then Latin America and, by the 
start of the 1990s, eastern Europe and parts of Asia, but largely bypassed the 
countries of North Africa and the Middle East.1 The reasons for this were 
fairly apparent: in numerous countries with large oil and gas reserves, 
governments bought the support of the population with cash and generous 
social benefits. The patriarchal traditions in these distinctly religious societies 
underpinned a hierarchical order that fundamentally impeded attempts at a 
critical political discourse. Autocratic regimes, in response to occasional 
demands from Europe and the United States to respect and extend human 
and political participation rights, repeatedly pointed to the threat to stability 
and security in the region allegedly posed by Islamic extremism or hasty 
liberalization. This argument, if nothing else, became caught up in the eyes of 
Western governments with the issue of Israel’s security interests. Lastly, the 
governing elites were able to stifle any incipient protest with increasingly 
sophisticated mechanisms of repression and control.  
Although there have been recurrent demonstrations against government 
policies in the past – such as 2008’s protest marches in the phosphate-rich 
Gafsa region of Tunisia and in the southern Moroccan port of Sidi Ifni, or the 
weeks of protests in 2009 against the rigging of the presidential elections in 
Iran in favor of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – these demonstrations never 
seriously jeopardized the regimes in power. Governments soon brought such 
protests to a standstill by offering social benefits, making promises and 
deploying brute force, after which they continued undaunted on their corrupt, 
anti-reform course. The apparent stability of this autocratic domination lasted 
until December 17, 2010, when, in the insignificant little Tunisian town of Sidi 
Bouzid, the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi doused himself in gasoline and 
 
1 It is worth mentioning here that these global transformative developments also provided 
the impetus to create the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) in the mid-
1990s. Since 2004, the BTI has appeared every two years, surveying and assessing the state 
of democracy, economic transformation and the management achievements of the 
governments of 128 countries in transition; see also www.bti-project.de.  
 set himself on fire in protest of the repeated humiliation and harassment he 
had suffered at the hands of local authorities. 
This self-immolation led directly to demonstrations against the regime of 
President Ben Ali, who had held office since 1987. The demonstrations 
quickly spread throughout the country, taking the form of days of non-violent 
protests, particularly in the capital, Tunis. When the Tunisian generals refused 
to deploy military force against the demonstrators, it signaled the end of Ben 
Ali’s reign. His resignation on January 14th became a beacon for the entire 
region, encouraging subsequent demonstrations in almost every Arab state. 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates proved to be the only countries in which 
no notable demonstrations took place over the course of the year. 
Even today, a full twelve months after the start of these events, the answers 
to many fundamental questions remain unsatisfactory. For example, it is not 
yet clear why no protest movement had transpired in the Arab world earlier 
and why the demonstrators were able in early 2011, of all times, to achieve 
their objectives with relative ease and speed. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
identify certain core factors that evidently interacted to decisive effect. These 
include the enormous dissatisfaction among broad swathes of the population, 
which was accompanied by a willingness and ability on the part of a few 
central actors within the protest movements to take responsibility and 
initiative. The use of the latest communication technology was combined with 
the astonishingly strong solidarity between various sections and strata of the 
population, who supplied each other with food, tents, cell phone chargers and 
access to electricity on Avenue Habib Bourguiba in the center of Tunis and on 
Tahrir Square in the heart of Cairo. Finally, non-violent protest movements 
were met by level-headed military commanders. 
However, this merely describes the specific factors behind the successful 
political transformation in Tunisia and Egypt. These were the only two 
countries in which there was a relatively peaceful change of regime (relatively 
peaceful, given that at least 200 died in Tunisia and more than 800 people lost 
their lives in Egypt during the revolutions). By contrast, in all the other 
countries, protests were either quickly suppressed by security forces or there 
were major clashes between demonstrators and the military. In Yemen, in 
particular, as well as Libya and Syria, there was fighting approaching the level 
of civil war that has dragged on for months and resulted in many deaths. As 
such, the issue at stake is not merely to identify the strategies of the protest 
movements and the dynamics of the various revolutionary processes, but to 
establish the similarities and differences among the individual countries in 
terms of the framework and conditions in which these developments have 
occurred. 
Despite all the surprise, the upheavals and protest movements did not 
exactly appear out of thin air. In fact, the data in the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
Transformation Index (BTI) provide ample insight into the fundamental 
political and economic deficits found in the Arab world of recent years. The 
BTI findings point not only to widespread political stagnation, found almost 
everywhere in the region, but also to the limits of economic improvement, 
which is effectively confined to the Gulf states. The BTI reports also show 
how this is combined with increasing socioeconomic tensions, especially in the 
large, non-oil-based national economies. Finally, the BTI data contain 
considerable evidence of disappointed hopes after the moves toward political 
and economic liberalization in the first half of the 2000s, which, despite 
bringing about privatization and some new laws, have failed to introduce 
lasting improvements for the majority of the population. 
Whereas the underlying problems in each country show similar features, 
there are considerable differences in terms of their respective sociopolitical 
contexts. This is also true of the six countries most affected by the revolts of 
2011, that is, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. Whereas Egypt 
and Tunisia, for example, are popular holiday destinations and earn a 
significant proportion of their public revenues from tourism, meaning that 
they have to take greater care of their image abroad, this does not apply to 
Libya, Syria or Yemen. Libya and Bahrain are classic rentier states, thanks to 
their oil and gas reserves (although in Bahrain these reserves are quickly 
diminishing and the income is very unequally distributed), whereas Syria and 
Tunisia have only scant raw material deposits by comparison. Tribal 
 stratification continues to structure society in Libya and Yemen, while in 
Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, tribes are of secondary importance only. 
Country developments as reflected in the BTI 
A time-series comparison of the data in the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
Transformation Index for the countries in the North Africa and Middle East 
region brings these differences to light. One example is trends in political 
transformation (see Table 1): whereas Egypt (2008 – 2012: -0.32), Bahrain (-
0.28), Yemen (-0.20) and Tunisia (-0.10) have registered lower scores since the 
BTI 2008, Libya (+0.12) and Syria (+0.58) have noticeably advanced political 
transformation. The overall regional score for political transformation 
improved by 0.16 points between 2008 and 2012, so four of the six countries 
singled out here deteriorated, despite the positive trend in the region. 
Table 1: State of political transformation, BTI 2008 – 2012 
 
Similarly divergent trends can also be identified for the state of economic 
transformation, although with the situation reversed: five of the six countries 
that experienced a revolution improved (even if only slightly, in some cases), 
following the overall trend for the region (see Table 2). Only Tunisia worsened 
(markedly, by -0.68 points), so possible social and economic triggers should be 
sought there for the eruption of mass demonstrations; all the other states 
remained constant (Bahrain, Egypt and Yemen) or improved significantly: 
Libya gained 0.36 points and Syria 0.43. 
Table 2: State of economic transformation, BTI 2008 – 2012  
 
Again, the six states are very different in terms of the governments’ 
management performance (see Table 3): Bahrain (-0.48), Tunisia (-0.41), 
Yemen (-0.30) and Libya (-0.26) worsened considerably, so that deficiencies in 
political management need to be examined in greater detail in order to 
investigate possible causes for heightened popular dissent. Egypt, by 
comparison, remained stable and Syria managed to improve significantly 
(+0.68). For the region overall, hardly any improvement (+0.09) has been 
recorded. In fact, things appear to be stagnating at a low level. 
 Table 3:  Transformation management scores, BTI 2008 – 2012 
 
 
So, although the series of BTI statistics do not show any clearly identifiable 
trends over the six years shown here that could retroactively explain the 
outbreak of large-scale protest, the tables do open up two significant 
perspectives that are fundamental to understanding the unrest. The following 
visual representation of the data aims to illustrate these issues: the 
deterioration of the MENA region in absolute terms compared to the other 
BTI regions, in every year and on every index (with the exception of the 
economic index for the two African regions, Post-Soviet Eurasia and Asia and 
Oceania (in 2010 and 2012)); the worsening situation for the MENA states, 
almost across the board, from the BTI 2010 to BTI 2012. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Political transformation, BTI 2008 – BTI 2012 
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Economic transformation, BTI 2008 – BTI 2012 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Transformation management, BTI 2008 – BTI 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The combination of these two factors – that is, the worst absolute scores 
worldwide for democracy and management performance, and the 
unsatisfactory economic performance overall (despite mineral wealth) together 
with the deterioration recorded since the BTI 2010 – provide initial clues to 
possible causes of the growing protest against the established regimes. Up 
until January 2011, for example, the state of political transformation in Egypt 
and Yemen had clearly deteriorated. Selected questions show the following 
changes for the two countries over two years (BTI 2010 – BTI 2012) (see 
Table 4). 
Table 4: Changes in democracy scores in Egypt and Yemen, BTI 2010 – 2012 
 
 
In two years, Yemen deteriorated drastically, particularly in the area of 
stateness (questions 1.1 to 1.4) and sociopolitical integration (5.1 to 5.4), 
whereas Egypt worsened in terms of the rule of law, in particular (3.1 to 3.4). 
The signs of disintegration in Yemen are complex and especially pronounced, 
with at least three major internal conflicts of note: (1) clashes between the 
Huthi rebels and the government in the northern province of Saada, which 
have recently spilled over into the neighboring western province of Hajjah; (2) 
the confrontation between al-Qaeda cells in central Yemen and the 
government, which in January 2010 officially declared war on the terrorists, 
most of whom have infiltrated the country from Saudi Arabia; and (3) the 
separatist tensions between the former South Yemen and the government, 
which have the potential to split the country in two.  
Egypt regressed notably in terms of independence of the judiciary. Whereas 
independent jurists were responsible for monitoring the 2005 parliamentary 
elections, the most open and fair in Egypt’s history, this responsibility was 
transferred back to an election committee with close ties to the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) in the 2010 ballot. In addition, civil proceedings 
were increasingly transferred to military courts, making them vulnerable to 
intervention by military commanders and, in the final instance, the regime. 
Although the democratic standard remained largely stable in Bahrain and 
Tunisia in the period between BTI 2010 and BTI 2012, both countries had 
deteriorated in the two years prior to that (see Table 5); comparing BTI 2008 
and BTI 2010, downward trends are apparent for several questions, such as 
the issue of stateness in Tunisia (questions 1.1 to 1.4). The greater fragility of 
the state was reflected in the handling of the workers’ uprisings in the Gafsa 
region in 2008 and in some attacks and tourist kidnappings in the west of the 
country in the same year, for example. In Bahrain, meanwhile, there were 
retrograde trends in the area of opportunities for political participation 
(questions 2.1 to 2.4); a clear example of this can be seen in the numerous 
restrictions to freedom of the press and expression, ranging from the minor to 
the serious. However, some positive development was also noted in these two 
countries over the same period, such as slightly improved rights for both 
chambers of the Bahraini parliament and the reduction in censorship measures 
against the Tunisian media. 
 
 
 Table 5:  Changes in democracy scores in Bahrain and Tunisia, BTI 2010 – 2012 
 
Syria and Libya need to be examined as “special cases.” In Libya, some 
improvements were made at a very low level between 2008 and 2012, thanks 
to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi’s more open rhetoric and his father Muammar al-
Qadhafi’s attempts at international reconciliation; nevertheless, these 
improvements were undermined by diminished rights of political participation, 
in particular. In contrast, Syria has achieved some change over time, but hardly 
anything altered overall between 2006 and 2012, as shown by the values in the 
net column (colored gray) in Table 6. 
Table 6:    Changes in selected democracy scores in Syria over time (BTI 2006 – 2012); the 
colored markings indicate deterioration/improvement. 
 
The wavelike ups and downs in Syria that can be seen in Table 6 clearly 
reflect the mixture of hope and disappointment. When the then-34-year-old 
Bashar al-Asad took office as the new president in 2000, there were great 
hopes that he would clear away much of the dead wood that had built up 
 during the reign of his father and predecessor in office, Hafez al-Asad; but by 
the middle of the decade, disenchantment had set in. Although a few reforms 
were, indeed, set in motion during Bashar’s first years of power, this was 
followed by a period of stagnation and even deterioration, as depicted vividly 
in the BTI 2008 country report. Although some small steps were taken 
towards liberalizing the formerly strict Ba’athist structure, that is, a socialist 
system based on a one-party state and tailored to conditions in Syria, this did 
not result in any genuine increase in political openness – and certainly no 
changes that could have endangered the existence of the Asad regime. The 
improvements noted in the BTI 2010 were the result of the president’s new 
strategy of increasingly appointing experts to key policy-making positions, 
instead of party ideologues. This mitigated both the lack of expertise in public 
administration, and the overwhelming influence of the Ba’ath Party. 
In-depth analysis: The events of 2010 in the six MENA states most affected by 
protests: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen 
Tunisia and Egypt, the greatest challenges proved to be preparing for the 
first democratic elections and the question of how best to deal with supporters 
of the old regime. Both countries have tried their former dictators in court, 
initiated a constitutional reform process and banned their former sole political 
parties, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) and 
National Democratic Party (NDP). Whereas in Egypt the ruling military junta 
has ordered the reforms “from above” and largely prevented any measures 
that would restrict the army’s influence, it was a civil government in Tunisia 
that introduced the proceedings, permitting a far greater degree of 
participation by civil society. This difference is illustrated by the manner in 
which the two countries approached the task of creating a new constitution in 
preparing for future elections: In Egypt, the military junta adopted the 
transitional constitution and hastily ratified it in a referendum arranged at 
short notice for March 19th, and parliamentary elections were then held in 
various stages on this basis in the winter of 2011/2012. The newly elected 
parliament is now tasked with drawing up the new Egyptian constitution in a 
committee. When the electoral commission was appointed on June 19th, 2011, 
the military junta expressly stated that international observers would not be 
accredited for the elections, as this would undermine Egypt’s sovereignty. This 
statement was met with protest at the international level, but it also caused 
outrage among numerous Egyptian civil society groupings due to the 
legitimate concern that the military would impede a fundamental process of 
democratization. Critics feared that the military junta wished merely to install a 
new government favorable to themselves, with only limited democratic 
legitimacy, and would not tolerate genuine political competition between 
various parties and ballot options. Given the overwhelming success of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Al-Nour Party in the initial ballots (about 50% 
and 25% of the vote, respectively), it remains to be seen whether the military 
will, in fact, consent to transferring power to the interim government and 
parliament. Alternatively, it is conceivable that the Islamists and military will 
reach a power-sharing agreement and that the Muslim Brotherhood will in 
future be the dominant party in Egypt, under the military’s supervision. 
In Tunisia, there was some political turmoil immediately following Ben Ali’s 
downfall, including the repeated formation of new governments. The situation 
calmed somewhat only after interim Prime Minister Beji Caid Sebsi took office 
on February 27th and formed a completely new cabinet. Overall, the country 
has taken steps to advance the transformation process, even if the original 
schedule for democratization has been postponed more than once. After 
sluggish voter registration in August, the elections for the Constitutional 
Convention were held on October 23rd, professionally and in accordance with 
international standards. The result was a resounding win for the Islamist 
Ennahda (“Renaissance”) party (the strongest faction by far, with 90 of 217 
seats), which disappointed many of the January demonstrators, given that the 
original protests took place largely without any help from Islamist 
representatives, who nonetheless were the biggest winners of the free elections 
(see also the article by Ghali in this volume). The Constitutional Convention 
assembled for its first session in the fall of 2011 and, within the space of a 
year, plans to develop the fundamental structures of Tunisia’s future political 
system (Loetzer 2011); the actual parliamentary and presidential elections will 
not take place until the new constitution is adopted, probably at the end of 
2012. 
 Tunisia’s economy, recently so highly praised, has suffered from problematic 
developments. The country dropped dramatically in the BTI market economy 
index from 2008 (a point score of 6.79) to 2012 (6.11). The Tunisian 
economy’s close ties to the EU have been both a blessing and a curse. On the 
one hand, the 2008 economic crisis had far-reaching negative repercussions on 
Tunisia’s economy, which put huge pressure on supplier companies, 
particularly in the automotive and textile sectors. On the other hand, the 
future Tunisian government can hope to receive economic and political 
assistance from the EU and, by extension, support for its upcoming 
restructuring measures. After all, despite its current financial policy crisis, the 
EU is bound to maintain its economic relations to Tunisia and to cushion the 
economic insecurity that transformation will bring. Economic and political 
support of this kind is considerably easier for a total population of 10.5 million 
Tunisians than for 84.5 million Egyptians. 
As such, despite similarities with the course of events in Tunisia, 
developments in Egypt make it far harder to assess the prospects of success 
for the transformation process that has begun (see the article by Kienle in this 
volume). Although the party landscape is more diverse than in Tunisia, thanks 
to a more open fundamental outlook on the part of the Mubarak regime in the 
past, the regime intensified its repressive measures after the 2005 Cairo Spring; 
as a result, Egypt fell significantly in the BTI democracy index from 2008 (4.40 
points) to 2012 (4.08 points). Furthermore, the economic outlook is grim. 
Despite a marginally improved overall score for Egypt’s economic 
transformation in the BTI, from 5.36 points in 2008 to 5.43 in 2012, the 
liberalization measures taken in recent years were not sufficiently anchored in 
principles of social justice, and an increasing proportion of the population has 
sunk into poverty. The coming economic uncertainties, expected to involve 
mass layoffs in the oversized state-owned companies and the bloated civil 
service, as well as a decline in bookings in the tourism sector, will entail heavy 
losses for many in the population. As such, it is to be feared that those who 
lose out in the transformation process as well as those socially marginalized 
sections of the population may become radicalized. The success of the radical 
Islamist Al-Nour Party at the ballot box in the winter of 2011/2012 is an 
initial warning sign here. The increasingly aggressive demeanor of jihadist 
splinter groups towards political opponents since the end of the Mubarak 
regime justify fears that Egyptian society is facing serious confrontation 
between liberal and radical forces. The 2012 Transformation Index already 
testifies to an increasing intensity of conflict within Egyptian society and this, 
together with the economic issues mentioned above, comprise the core 
political challenges to be addressed. 
This also applies to a large extent to Bahrain, which suffers from a 
religiously based underlying conflict arising from the split between a Shi’ite 
majority (about 70% of Bahrainis are Shi’ites) and a Sunni governing elite that 
holds almost all the top positions in the state, army and society. This not only 
leads to recurrent tensions within the country, it also plays an important role 
in the regional balance of power. On the one hand, the country’s geostrategic 
position in the middle of the oil and gas-rich region of the Persian Gulf is 
important to the global economy, on the other hand, maintaining Sunni rule in 
Shi’ite Bahrain has a great (psychological) significance to the rivalry between 
the two major regional powers: Saudi Arabia (strictly Sunni) and Iran (strictly 
Shia). This explains why, after the massive protests and weeks of unrest broke 
out in Bahrain in early 2011, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (both 
member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which, apart from Bahrain, is 
Sunni dominated) sent hundreds of soldiers to Bahrain to put a violent end to 
the demonstrations and prop up the Sunni Al Khalifa dynasty. 
The BTI has described these internal conflicts since the country was 
included in the ranking in 2008: the Sunni minority increasingly mistrusts the 
Shi’ite majority, as shown by Bahrain’s drop in scores from 6 points to 5 for 
the BTI question regarding social capital. The conflict is reflected at the 
highest political level: although the government permits Shi’ite interest groups 
(parties per se are not allowed in Bahrain) and invites them to take part in the 
political process via official registration, the two most important Shi’ite groups, 
al-Haq and al-Wafa, refuse to do so. Accordingly, the assessment of the 
Bahraini party system improved by one point (from 3 to 4I) between the BTI 
2008 and BTI 2012. These Shi’ite groups fear that closer integration into the 
political system would not result in better opportunities to exert an influence, 
but would rather enable the repressive state apparatus to exercise greater 
control over their activities. In fact, it is reasonable to fear that this is the real 
motivation for the government’s apparently open approach. In view of the 
 restrictions to political participation that have been imposed, the BTI 2012 has 
downgraded Bahrain by one point each in the areas of “association and 
assembly rights” and “freedom of expression,” in which it now scores 3. 
In addition to the underlying sectarian conflict, the security forces have also 
increasingly had to deal with protests by South and East Asian migrant 
laborers, many of whom have to work under appalling conditions. Whether it 
is the recurrent roadblocks with burning barricades, starting in January 2009, 
or the violent confrontations between demonstrators and the police in August 
2010, with up to 230 arrested – the BTI 2012 country report clearly illustrates 
the problems and features a drop of two points since the 2008 edition of the 
Transformation Index for “monopoly on the use of force” (from a score of 10 
to 8). 
This ominous growth in tension in Bahrain is accompanied by the ruling 
family’s increasing grip on the justice system. The 2012 country report 
describes in detail examples of how the king has repeatedly interfered in the 
dispensation of justice, for example by pardoning convicted persons and 
thereby seriously undermining court decisions. In general, judges are 
appointed by the king and enjoy little independence. The increasingly limited 
space for independent jurisdiction is reflected in the falling score for 
“independent judiciary” from 5 in the BTI 2008 to 4 in the current survey. 
Added to this, jurisdiction has effectively been split in two since a separate set 
of family and individual rights was codified for Sunnis in May 2009. This had 
the effect of intensifying the social schism along sectarian lines in the legal 
sphere, as well. 
In recent years, BTI experts have observed in Yemen a trend similar to 
developments in Bahrain, that is, a worsening of the general security situation 
and increased tensions between the population and government and between 
different communities. However, this trend is much more intense in Yemen. 
The country, one of the poorest in the world, is faced by a variety of 
problems, from rapid demographic change, via growing ecological problems, 
to an increasingly poor provision of basic services in remote regions. Ethnic 
conflicts between tribes, the political tensions between North and South 
Yemeni fractions resulting from the former partitioning of the country, and 
growing disputes with criminal and terrorist organizations have made the 
country virtually ungovernable outside the major cities. The conflicts in the 
northern province of Saada between Huthi rebels and the government, and 
the associated socioeconomic context and religious factors, take up a large part 
of the BTI 2012 country report. The repressive persecution of Sunni 
extremists in Saudi Arabia has shifted the problem to Yemen, where the lack 
of state control in some regions has given al-Qaeda an ideal base to which to 
retreat and from which to work on destabilizing the government of President 
Ali Abdallah Salih. In the past, the government attempted to check the rising 
tide of unrest with increased repression: civil rights were restricted and the 
press, once astonishingly free by regional standards, was subjected to stricter 
control, as can be seen in the lower BTI 2012 score for the question ”freedom 
of expression.” Despite escalating the repressive measures, President Salih was 
unable to hold on to power: after months of protests and negotiations, he 
agreed on November 23rd to a conflict solution plan put forward by the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and appointed his former deputy Abd Rabou Mansour 
Hadi as interim president, under whom democratic elections are to be 
prepared. 
The country’s disintegration is clearly expressed by the drop in score for 
“state identity”: whereas Yemen received a score of 8 here in the BTI 2008, 
the analysts for the BTI 2012 were only able to award 6 points in the area of 
state identity; according to this, large swathes of the population are 
increasingly identifying more with their regional affiliation than with the state 
as a whole. The downgrade in the area of “social capital” from 5 to 4 is also a 
consequence of this trend. This does not bode well for the future of the 
country as a unitary centralized state. The mixture of state collapse, a 
weakened sense of national solidarity, and criminal intrigue lend credence to 
voices warning about an implosion of the country and the “Somaliazation” of 
Yemen. In this context, it is hard to assess the growing influence of religious 
actors on the political process. Whereas the BTI 2008 was able to point out 
that, unlike in other Arab states, religious institutions did not interfere in 
Yemeni politics and the relevant question (”no interference of religious 
dogmas”) received a score of 6, above the regional average, the current report 
refers to the founding in the summer of 2008 of a morality police along Saudi 
lines and an “Islamic Scholars Committee,” which President Salih called into 
 being in August 2010 in order to advise the government; as a result, the 
relevant score dropped to 4 points. 
In Libya, both progressive and retrograde developments were recorded in 
the years running up to the fall of the “Guide of the Revolution,” Muammar 
al-Qadhafi. For a long time, al-Qadhafi was an international pariah, mainly due 
to the actions of the Libyan secret service in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
specifically the bombing of a passenger aircraft over the Scottish town of 
Lockerbie in December 1988. However, in recent years his reputation 
improved, not merely due to the economic interests of Western governments 
or al-Qadhafi’s support in stopping the flow of refugees into Europe, but also 
because of constructive mediation such as the negotiations with the Abu 
Sayyaf rebels on the Filipino island of Jolo in 2000, which ended with the 
release of a kidnapped German family, or the manifest Libyan policy of 
distancing itself from acts of terrorism. Positive recent developments raised 
hopes among observers that Libya’s domestic politics would also be 
liberalized. In particular, the Qadhafi Foundation headed by al-Qadhafi’s son 
Saif al-Islam excelled lately with various notable initiatives aimed at 
strengthening civil society, education and equal opportunities. 
In the end, however, the underlying repressive nature of the Libyan 
autocracy remained unaltered. The scores in the BTI 2012 do not even come 
close to the minimum democratic standards in any of the categories of the 
Political Transformation Index. The only exception to this is the regime-
neutral stateness criterion. It is symptomatic that, apart from this, the highest 
score achieved is a mere 4 for the question of prosecution of office abuse. No 
political parties were allowed in al-Qadhafi’s Libya and the annual sessions of 
the Basic People’s Congress were, in the end, nothing more than empty 
parliamentary routine of no significance to genuine politics: the Revolutionary 
Command Council, consisting of al-Qadhafi and his closest associates, 
ultimately determined the nation’s fortunes with no real consultation. The BTI 
2012 report describes a probable power struggle between reform-minded 
members of the regime and reactionary forces. The increasing repression 
resulting from this power struggle, such as the months-long suspension of two 
newspapers that were favorable to the reformers in 2010, are reflected in the 
lower BTI scores in the areas of “free and fair elections” (from 2 to 1), 
“freedom of expression” (also from 2 to 1) and “independent judiciary” (from 
3 to 2). This latter was abused as a tool for political interests in the diplomatic 
dispute between Libya and Switzerland when al-Qadhafi’s son Hannibal was 
arrested in Geneva in July 2008 (all score comparisons are between BTI 2008 
and BTI 2012).  
The massive protests in Syria came after what was, in principle, a positive 
national trend in the BTI Status Index. However, these improvements were 
largely achieved up to the BTI 2010, after which almost every area of 
transformation experienced deadlock at what was still a very low level. It is 
also important to remember the downward trends between 2006 and 2008 
that were mentioned before. Taking the 2006 Transformation Index as a 
starting point, almost no change is apparent in Syria (see also Table 6 on page 
26). 
The majority of the protests in Syria have been aimed at the still 
unchallenged repressive machinery of a religious minority (the Asad family are 
Alawis, a religious group associated with Shia Islam, whereas the majority of 
Syrians are Sunni). Nevertheless, the protests against the Asad regime in 2011 
were not religiously motivated; instead, they were focused on the system’s 
outmoded structures and the lack of freedom in the country. 
So what drove the demonstrators onto the streets in almost every Arab state 
in 2011? As this analysis shows, no single reason can be identified. However, 
the data in the Transformation Index make it possible to deduce some 
tendencies that help provide a retrospective explanation: 
Overall, despite individual improvements in some countries, the MENA 
region scores very poorly on a global scale in terms of both its democracy and 
economic data. Comparing regions, North Africa and the Middle East is much 
closer to the African BTI regions than to Asia or even Latin America. 
After some improvements in the middle and second half of the last decade, 
reforms that had been made were revoked in almost every Arab state, and 
 particularly in Egypt, Libya and Syria. With the exception of Kuwait and Iraq, 
the level of political transformation stagnated or dropped in every country in 
the MENA region in the BTI 2012 compared to the BTI 2010. 
One strong signal for the normative basis of the Transformation Index, 
which consciously focuses on democracy under the rule of law and a market 
economy anchored in principles of social justice as the best possible form of 
government, is Shibley Telhami’s observation (2011): he pointed out in the 
early days of the protests that the uprisings were far less about food than they 
were about dignity. And according to Arnold Hottinger (2011) “the Arab 
revolutionaries talk about regaining their ‘dignity.’ They felt dehumanized and 
degraded at being seen by the powerful as nothing more than a resource to be 
used and exploited.” The organizers of the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia 
were not members of the impoverished underclass – not even the street 
vendor Mohamed Bouazizi was. But they were and are members of a society 
that had suffered decades of humiliation and indignity at the hands of their 
respective regimes, or they were well educated university graduates facing a 
lack of jobs and little prospect of a fulfilled life. The regimes of the Arab 
world have not merely ruled kleptocratically in recent years, they have not only 
deliberately manipulated conflicts for their own purposes, and they have not 
simply ruled arbitrarily and as they see fit. Above all, they have systematically 
deprived their people of dignity. Human dignity is best framed in 
constitutional democracies and socially just market economies: two areas in 
which the Arab regimes have consistently failed in the past. Now it is up to the 
new rulers to create political and economic structures that will guarantee both 
a better future for the respective countries and the dignity of their people. 
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 Late in 2010, Tunisians of all ages and with no clear political affiliation took 
to the streets in a call for change. The slogans started with timid demands for 
reform denouncing social injustice. Faced with the blindness and oppression 
of the regime, the protestors’ demands escalated to a bold political call for 
regime change. The surprise outcome came within days and with relative 
minimum costs, compared to similar revolutions. Tunisia’s tyrant leader, 
President Ben Ali, fled the country, leaving behind a chaotic political scene.  
During this revolution and the events following, a number of things caught 
my attention and further convinced me of the validity of the people’s call. For 
one, the uprising was nonpartisan in the sense that no single politician or 
opposition leader sought to exploit it for their individual aspirations by 
assuming a dominant position, or could legitimately stake a claim in any such 
position. For another, despite security concerns, most state institutions have 
carried on with their work. There have been no shortages of electricity, water, 
fuel, food, or any other basic product. Finally, most Tunisians have felt united 
in overthrowing a regime and embarking on the path toward some form of 
change for their country.  
Following Ben Ali’s flight from the country, an interim government was 
established to drive the process of political transition. This early period of 
political transformation was characterized by new political dynamics as new 
political figures and approaches to running state affairs were introduced to 
Tunisian politics. Despite the security concerns of early 2011, I had great 
expectations of the political process for just one reason: It was run by 
individuals with insignificant political and partisan affiliation. Indeed, during 
this phase of political transition, four independent commissions were 
established: one dealing with the political process (an unelected parliament of 
sorts); one dealing with the investigation of corruption and embezzlement; 
one dealing with human rights abuses; and the last dealing with organization 
of elections. Each of these commissions was headed by well-known figures in 
civil society and academia of unquestionable integrity. None of them harbored 
any political ambitions, and none of them ran for office after completing his 
mission. Recognition, respect and gratitude shall be paid to these agents of 
reform. I personally bow before them, for their work, neutrality and success.  
During this phase we saw the establishment of a government of technocrats, 
again, most of them with no political ambitions. They all replied to the 
national call of saving a country at this critical juncture. Time was short and 
the challenges immense, but this team, led by transitional Prime Minister Beji 
Caid Essebsi, a fine elderly statesman who had held several ministerial 
positions under President Bourguiba, succeeded in making unprecedented 
decisions: signing the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute; lifting all 
measures preventing the implementation of the international human rights 
conventions; establishing an independent elections commission and 
unprecedented freedoms of the press and association. These accomplishments 
were mostly of apolitical nature; little was done within the economic sphere. 
Nonetheless, these decisions drew great attention and respect from the 
international community, boosting Tunisia’s image and credibility as the first 
Arab country to embark on a path of democratic transition in 2011. This 
international recognition is of primary importance for a country attempting to 
attract the investment needed to tackle unemployment, which was one of the 
main drivers of the revolution.  
However, alongside this almost utopist dynamic, political and partisan 
dynamics were growing and beginning to influence political and social life. 
Divisions and cleavages based mostly on ideological and religious grounds 
emerged among the political elite and their new constituencies. In a country 
with very few democratic traditions, political parties were quite successful in 
building their campaigns and extending their affiliation networks through 
undemocratic practices (e.g., bribery), demonstrating a lack of religious 
tolerance toward other religious groups, and by making unrealistic electoral 
promises. 
At the end of this initial phase of the transformation process that centered 
around the election of a Constituent Assembly, some of the so-called 
 progressive democrats entering the electoral race and those supporting the 
process (i.e., members of the various commissions and representatives of civil 
society as well as the economic and cultural elite) placed so much confidence 
in the veracity of their hopes and dreams and the reliability of their peers that 
they failed to deliver a unified project of progressive democratic 
transformation for Tunisia. We all believed that we were defending the noble 
objective of democracy, an attainable dream with different facets, but 
obviously shared by every Tunisian supportive of the revolution. At the other 
end of the political spectrum, advocates of a more traditional and conservative 
approach to change, that is, an approach based on religion, tradition and 
(sometimes) intolerance, were closer to their constituencies. As a result, they 
were able to galvanize support for a single unified project of transformation 
shaped by a specific interpretation of democracy. Exercising their political 
acumen, they won the election and ushered in the second phase of transition: 
constitution-building. 
This post-election phase of transition has since been shaped by partisan 
affiliation, the dynamics of majority or minority rule, and the need for 
coalitions and counter coalitions. The unifying dream of a democratic Tunisia, 
initially shared by many, has become a disassembled puzzle in which each side 
tries to force its pieces with little regard for those held by others. Some might 
argue this is merely the rule of the game, every winning party has the right to 
enjoy its success. But we should remember that the objective of this phase is 
to write a constitution, not run a country as if subject to a regular legislative 
term. A constitution is a national document to be shared and owned by all 
Tunisians today as well as those of decades and centuries to come. If a 
constitution is to succeed in providing the legal framework for a democratic 
nation, it ought to be sufficiently inclusive of all Tunisians irrespective of their 
political and partisan affiliation. 
Personally, I have little faith that the ruling conservative coalition will draft a 
constitution inclusive enough to consider the variety of differences among all 
Tunisians. The ruling coalition appears to be aiming for a constitution that not 
only establishes their less progressive and diverse vision of Tunisia but 
confirms conservative rule as the only political option. Unfortunately, this 
ruling majority is succeeding in its use of religion to garner support among 
many Tunisians in high jacking the once-shared dream of the revolution.  
On October 25th, the day election results were announced, a progressive 
friend of mine commented on a social media platform “…today I discovered 
that I am part of a minority, the question is: Will the majority guarantee my 
minority rights?” I do not want to end this piece on such a depressing note. 
But I do believe that the transition to democracy is an everlasting struggle. 
Tunisia, as well as other countries of the Arab region, is destined to connect 
progressive and conservative visions of democracy. Those advocating 
democracy in Tunisia will need to find the right balance between their dream 
of a democracy based on humanistic values and the bargain-making demands 
of partisan politics. 
 As the wave of Arab Spring revolutions beginning in Tunisia and Egypt hit 
Libya in early 2011, it was logical to expect an uprising in Libya. From a 
historical perspective, Libyans have always been affected by the winds of 
change in its neighboring countries. People in the Libyan (eastern) city of 
Benghazi – who number among the country’s most disadvantaged and 
deprived – soon took to the streets, marking the launch of the February 17 
revolution that quickly engulfed the entire country.  
The uprising in Benghazi was triggered by Muammar al-Qadhafi’s violent 
response to peaceful demonstrations in which Libyans demanded the release 
of political prisoners. In a futile attempt to regain lost ground, the infamous 
Khamis Brigade, the tyrant leader’s security force, resorted to the massacre of 
innocent Libyans, committed acts of genocide against a peaceful population, 
and imposed a blockade on the Libyan capital of Tripoli. 
In an article I wrote for the Daily Star on March 4, I wrote: “These crimes 
must leave no option for the international community but to intervene against 
the regime, depriving it of its international legitimacy, as it lost all legitimacy 
among Libyan citizens.” Fortunately, I was able to express myself freely at the 
time, being one of many that chose exile instead of living under tyranny. 
Due to the pressures associated with the air embargo and the resolve of the 
freedom fighters, Tripoli was liberated on August 27, 2011. This ultimately led 
to the fall of al-Qadhafi’s last bastion in Sirt (central Libya), which in turn led 
to his capture and death on October 20, 2011. 
Thus, for the first time in 42 years, Libyans have regained their pride and 
command of their national memory. They are determined to take the reins in 
managing their huge national wealth, whether this be in relation to oil, 
agriculture, tourism, industry or free trade. All these sectors harbor great 
potential for Libya.  
Though much has been achieved since the uprising on 17 February 2011, a 
great deal of work still lies ahead. At every step along the way, Libyans have 
remained steadfast in demonstrating national unity and exercising their free 
will. Yet they face the daunting task of building an entire country and its 
institutions almost from scratch. But perhaps the most important challenges 
ahead lie in restoring democratic values and a culture of tolerance. 
The oppressive al-Qadhafi regime fostered a culture of dependency and 
hatred in which people were effectively deprived of their right to live freely. 
And by failing to provide or expand Libyans’ access to a decent education, 
adequate health care and employment, the regime robbed them of their social 
choices and opportunities. The privilege of engaging in free enterprise and 
yielding its benefits were reserved exclusively for those within the tyrant 
leader’s inner circle.  
Whereas countless young couples waited for years to receive the apartments 
they needed to wed, entire apartment blocks were built and handed over to 
members of local pro-Qadhafi militias, most of whom were already 
homeowners. For many Libyans, it was these kinds of spoils that represented 
only the tip of the iceberg, leaving them unconvinced of the change promised 
by Muammar al-Qadhafi’s second son and declared successor, Saif al-Islam 
Qadhafi.  
As al-Qadhafi’s regime began to fall apart during a revolution that lasted 
eight months, observers identified a situation in Libya very different from 
those situations seen in Tunisia and Egypt. In Libya, an entire country must be 
built anew, since al-Qadhafi left no institution untouched and kept a small 
security apparatus that was running the affairs of the state. This apparatus 
vanished following his capture and death. 
The National Transitional Council attempted to run the day-to-day affairs of 
the state, but soon ran into legitimacy problems of its own. Lacking proper 
planning and adequate funds, it faced severe difficulty in carrying out the tasks 
of governing. To make matters worse, suspicions of corruption have 
multiplied as old elements have apparently infiltrated the new system.  
 The transition process is not expected to be smooth. The current vacuum in 
the political arena leaves ample room for would-be politicians to capitalize on 
the absence of political parties and exploit regional rivalry or differences 
between secularists and fundamentalists. Using support from foreign countries 
to secure their own future positions, these opportunists, many of them armed 
groups, pose a threat by trying to steal the country’s recent achievements. 
They could derail current attempts to transition by exploiting the needs of 
citizens in order to purchase their support. Doing so would point the country 
down the path toward oligarchy.  
But the problems associated with political transition are not peculiar to 
Libya or the Middle East. Let us not forget the example of many East 
European states that are still facing difficulties in establishing democracy years 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. Given the current state of affairs in Libya, 
we should not expect to see consolidated democracy and stability in the near 
future.  
As Che Guevara said: the revolution is made by dreamers led by madmen 
and won by opportunists. 
What can be done? 
Once provisional state institutions are in place, an important step forward 
would involve kick-starting the economy by injecting funds obtained through 
the release of some of the frozen Libyan funds abroad. This will revive the 
services sector, provide some employment and liberate citizens from the 
dominance of private benefactors. With access to resources, the state could 
then provide much-needed community care services until elected bodies are in 
place to lead the development process. 
Economic growth and security are essential in the context of restoring 
democracy. Without it, the prospects for an effective and participatory process 
of state-building involving vast numbers of the Libyan population are bleak. 
Libya has much to offer in the beauty of its vast and long beaches, the 
diversity of its nature, the abundance of archaeological sites, and its 
agricultural potential. The people of Libya are at once extraordinarily kind and 
strong. Having endured considerable poverty and pain, they are determined to 
pursue justice and equality. 
The Libyan revolution marks not only the beginning of a thorny, tortuous 
and long journey to restore the country’s national will and rebuild active 
participation in the rights and duties of citizenship. The revolution also 
represents the beginning of an attempt to return looted capacities by restoring 
public stewardship of the country's national resources. Indeed, investing the 
wealth of these resources in the education of citizens will enable young people 
and women alike to serve their communities while bringing them prosperity. 
The concept of participation is an essential prerequisite to these efforts. 
Civic participation must be established early on, in particular by nurturing 
opportunities for the young to practice democracy within schools and 
universities. This involves teaching them tolerance and the appropriate means 
of claiming their rights while helping them resolve differences as they carry 
out their civic duties. Establishing youth associations in which students 
practice the art of debate, learning to acknowledge and interact with a diversity 
of opinions, is one possible means of teaching tolerance and citizenship. In 
order to facilitate democracy as a way of life, it is equally important to 
establish training centers where young people may exchange roles in the 
context of group work.  
For many Libyans today, the transition to democracy is a must. It must 
prevail, even if this involves a corrective movement. It must prevail for the 
sake of the tens of thousands of martyrs and wounded. In the eyes of the 
international community, the transition to democracy must prevail because its 
inception is the result of an unprecedented effort among European states to 
initiate the protection of citizens under the umbrella of NATO. Finally, the 
most important lesson to be learned is that the international community must 
look less to the oilfields of Libya and place greater faith in the country’s future 
as a source of stability on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. 
 For the last two decades, Egyptians have faced devastating societal problems 
including severe poverty, cancerous corruption, humiliating violations of 
human rights, excessive unemployment, high illiteracy rates, a widening of the 
gap between social classes and an erosion of the middle class. Egyptians felt 
no hope in their future. Meanwhile, the government persistently acted as 
though deaf to its citizens’ complaints.  
Yet what ultimately sparked the 2011 Egyptian revolution was the killing of 
a young Egyptian who lived in the city of Alexandria, the country’s second-
largest urban center after the capital Cairo. In June 2010, young Egyptian 
businessman Khaled Said died after being beaten by the police. Witnesses 
described how Said was taken from an Internet café, had his head smashed 
into marble stairs, and was left dead on a street in Alexandria. Said had 
angered police officers by copying a video they had made of themselves 
divvying up confiscated marijuana, which later appeared on YouTube. Like the 
young Tunisian who set himself on fire after being harassed by a low-level 
government official, Said hoped to draw attention to police officials’ 
corruption. 
In conjunction with these events, online social media took on a role as a 
substitute for traditional mass-media communications, much of which in 
Egypt are controlled by the state. Acting as an anonymous page administrator, 
the young Wael Ghoneim, Middle East marketing director for Google in 
Egypt, created a Facebook page called “We Are All Khaled Said.” The page 
featured horrific photos of Said’s tortured face, shot with a cell phone in the 
morgue. That visual evidence undermined the official explanations for his 
death. By December 2011, the Facebook page had attracted some 500,000 
members. After 30 years of emergency rule, abuses by police and state security 
officials had become so common that the Khaled Said case proved to be a 
natural rallying point for a diverse network of outraged Egyptians. 
On January 25, 2011, the day known as “Police Celebration Day,” many 
young Egyptians converged on Tahrir Square to demonstrate for democracy, 
social justice and freedom. The rest is history: The entire Egyptian population, 
across the country, joined these Egyptian youth in their call to overthrow the 
country’s corrupt regime after the shocking killing of well over 800 young 
demonstrators between January 25 and February 11, 2011, the day the ailing 
President Hosni Mubarak decided to step down. 
Watching the situation unfold during January and February 2011, I decided 
to support the transformation by serving as an active member of the local civil 
committee in charge of protecting the residential area around downtown 
Cairo, about two kilometers from the center of the revolution, Tahrir Square. I 
realized that the revolution needed many supportive and assisting hands if it 
were to succeed. I realized, too, that Tahrir Square was not the only venue in 
which one could demonstrate his or her support and provide an assisting 
hand.  
Moreover, in parallel, I decided to spread the word and share my inside 
views on and opinion of our 2011 revolution, helping others to understand its 
causes, players, primary forces and the challenges facing it. Hence, I took the 
initiative to accept several domestic and international invitations to lecture 
about the 2011 Egyptian revolution. 
Now that the revolution has become real, many Egyptians hope for a better 
country and a better future. Yet, Egypt cannot have a better future without 
lifting overwhelming pressures from the shoulders of its population. These 
pressures are diverse: the state of the Egyptian economy, the health care 
sector, the education sector, and most importantly, cultural and behavioral 
patterns and expectations. Collectively, their weight is too heavy; if the new 
Egypt is to move forward and achieve the goals of the 2011 revolution, it must 
lift this burden quickly, in the short term.  
Furthermore, one cannot hope to have a better future without also building 
a “better individual.” In other words, in order for Egypt to earn a better 
future, Egyptians must learn to respect and accept each other’s differences. 
 Egyptians should also focus on reinforcing social justice, combating illiteracy 
and gender inequality, upholding the rule of law and the freedom of 
expression, and above all, respecting human rights.  
Unfortunately, instead of building, educating, securing and lifting our 
economy, some sectors of Egypt’s civil society are a year later destroying, 
blocking, striking and calling for civil obedience – hence, hindering the 
Egyptian economy’s ability to move forward. 
My explanation for the situation currently unfolding in Egypt rests mainly 
on the fact that the average Egyptian, a year after the revolution, has not seen 
any genuine changes. The average Egyptian has not seen real, substantial 
changes in his or her life. On the contrary, as many Egyptians say: “We’ve 
removed the head, but the body remains riddled with cancerous cells in need 
of a fast remedy.”  
I believe Egyptians are expecting too much in too little time. This tends to 
exacerbate the situation. In addition, the tremendous lack of trust in any form 
of government and in executive officials has widened, as no tangible changes 
have as yet been witnessed in the Egyptian economy. 
Therefore, I strongly believe that Egyptians need to demonstrate more 
patience and more dedication to action rather than words. Three urgent and 
important tasks need to be addressed in parallel in order for Egypt to move 
forward. These include: establishing security on the streets; increasing 
employment; and settling sectarian differences, whether confessional or based 
in Islamic doctrine. First and foremost, street security must come at the top of 
the list of priorities for any government in power. Security in this context 
means protecting individuals, economic entities, tourism, foreign investment 
and expatriates. Second comes the state of the economy as a whole; in this 
area, the only way out of the dual traps of social injustice and poverty is not 
through international aid and assistance, but rather through work, work, work. 
Last but not least, I strongly believe that Egyptians need to work out their 
ethnic and doctrinal differences in order to move forward toward a better 
future. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, and thanks to the astonishing 
development of new information technologies, autarky is no longer possible, 
no matter where you live. The political changes which swept through East and 
Central Europe, as well as the more or less successful waves of 
democratization in countries across Latin America and Africa, have left Arab 
populations with an intense hunger for change. At the same time, there is a 
widespread and a well-founded sense that these diverse and varied populations 
have been left behind by the new global system. This impression has long 
been a factor in the support found for dictatorships and autocracy. For 
Western countries, established regimes have served as reliable guarantors of 
stability in the region, helping prevent the expansion of radical Islam and 
control the influx of immigrants. Western countries vigorously supported the 
maintenance of strong and brutal regimes capable of safeguarding the peace of 
an ally for which every impropriety is pardoned: Israel.  
Just after the start of the Arab uprising in Tunisia in January 2011, official 
announcements in Syria made it appear out of this world. When the wave of 
uprisings reached Egypt, the voice of denial persisted, attributing the Egyptian 
people’s anger toward its government to the Israeli Peace Treaty signed in 
1977. The Syrian media, which has for decades been subject to strict control, 
also served to mitigate the Arab Spring’s effect on the Syrian public. On 
January 31, 2011, Bashar al-Asad himself refuted any likelihood that “his” 
country would be affected by the wave of Arab uprisings. Praising the stability 
and trust which, according to him, characterize the relationship between the 
rulers and the ruled, Asad insisted that his country had undertaken gradual but 
genuine reforms over the past ten years. Less than two weeks after this 
declaration, the capital Damascus started to vibrate to the rhythm of small 
protest meetings – which were quickly repressed by the police. On March 15, 
children in the city of Daraa were arrested and tortured, and their families 
 humiliated while requesting their release. These events triggered the uprising 
that continues today. 
Their crime? The children, influenced by what they had seen in the press, 
dared to scrawl “down with the regime!” on a wall. This serious incident 
marks the true beginning of the people’s struggle in Syria. However, as with all 
the other revolts, the initial event is like a spark striking dry grass that has been 
parched by decades of repression, disastrous economic mismanagement, and 
endemic corruption.  
To illustrate the impact that I myself have felt, I would like to share a 
personal experience. Shortly before the popular uprising in Syria, I was 
wandering through the streets of Aleppo, the country’s second largest city and 
economic capital, in order to observe the social and political behavior of the 
population in the context of Arab revolts. I was struck by the people’s 
revolting calmness, their pathetic lack of concern. As a political scientist who 
has devoted his entire academic life to questions of democracy and human 
rights, and as the great-grandson of an erudite reformist famed for his writings 
on the “characteristics of despotism,” I could not help but feel a deep sense of 
bitterness. Suddenly, however, a moderate-sized demonstration literally 
appeared before me in the center of the city. Students, workers and officials 
were brandishing portraits of Che Guevara, Nasser and other emblematic 
figures of modern political history. Tears came to my eyes as I followed the 
procession and listened to the slogans demanding freedom and dignity. 
In a country where gatherings, even for a wedding party, require an 
authorization permit from the security forces, such a demonstration was, in 
my eyes, comparable to a revolution. But the most surprising aspect of the 
scene unfolding before me was the behavior of the police, who acted like 
casual bystanders, following the procession with lethargic, mocking gazes.  
This came as a true surprise, and it marked a real revolution in the political 
practices of the country. I came closer to opening a discussion with my bold 
fellow countrymen, while reproaching myself for the pessimism that had 
driven me to deny any likelihood of political reform being initiated by the 
young president in office for the past 11 years. Yet proof of an evolution was 
there, it was tangible! A protest demonstration without repression, now that’s 
really something! Just as I was about to approach a young woman 
demonstrating, a man’s voice yelled at me: “STOP you bloody (…) can’t you 
see we’re on air?”  
Shortly after this, my dreams began to come true, and this nation of people 
whom I had considered apolitical, obedient and apathetic, demonstrated great 
heroism by showing their anger and willingness to change their lives through 
peaceful demonstration. Every sneakily-orchestrated attempt by the 
government to discredit the protest movement has thus far failed. Even after 
more than 7,000 deaths and several thousand injured, young Syrians continue 
to demonstrate astonishing courage and determination to the world. In a 
country that has had effectively no political life for decades, the level of 
political consciousness and the sense of humor shown by its citizens confers a 
touch of hope on this unfolding tragedy.  
I no longer have the right to be a pessimist, since fiction has become reality. 
It has come at a high price, but it demonstrates that the Syrian people have 
taken their fate into their own hands, and that they will ineluctably obtain their 
freedom. 
Despite my own pessimism since the beginning of the Arab uprisings – 
accompanied by my doubts about their outcomes – I have often been 
pleasantly surprised by the results: tyrants do indeed leave. The rest is a 
complex and treacherous process. However, nothing will permit any regrets 
about the past. From this point onward and despite the high price exacted by 
the Syrian revolution, hope in the people and in their will must impose itself.  
Why have these events taken place now and not earlier? There are several 
factors that can explain the timing of these developments, be they planned or 
improvised. These include the accumulation of political frustration, a favorable 
political climate throughout the region, a severe economic crisis, and the 
stubborn antagonism of despotic rulers toward those attempts by traditional 
opposition forces to undertake concrete political reforms.  
Many observers and/or experts have been surprised by the Arab revolutions 
in general, and the ongoing revolt that has been taking place in Syria for 
almost a year. However, if we take a step back and examine the scholarly 
literature of the last 20 years, we see the details of a larger and more complex 
 picture of developments. Economic, demographic, political and even urban 
analyses point to the dismal failure of state apparatuses and a security takeover 
(securitocracy) of public and private life. The decline of the education system 
coupled with the widespread desire among most of Syria’s young and educated 
to emigrate underscore just how deep despair runs. The repeated attempts 
among intellectuals and activists to trigger a wave of hope by creating the 
perception of building blocks for reform within the wall of authoritarianism 
failed to yield the desired results. Repression has been the government’s sole 
response to the population’s legitimate claims.  
Since Bashar al-Asad came to power in 2000, there have been continual calls 
to reform the political system. These demands have never been radical. Those 
calling for such reforms would have been satisfied with a series of structural 
reforms in public policy and long-awaited advances in allowing for the 
freedom of expression. However, these calls were rejected with contempt and 
repression. So-called placebo actions have been undertaken instead to give the 
impression that genuine change was afoot. This policy might have attenuated 
some of the expectations and even convinced European governments of the 
Syrian government’s supposed will to undertake genuine reform. Since the 
beginning of the 21st century, famous personalities and Syrian political groups 
alike have tried in vain to reach out to the new regime headed by Bashar al-
Asad, who succeeded his father. They wanted to turn the page of the past 
“together” and try to make a fresh start in a relatively democratic new Syria. 
This included calls to establish an independent judicial system, annul the state 
of emergency (which has been in force since 1963), liberalize freedoms of 
assembly and expression, and introduce political pluralism and power sharing. 
But the al-Asad regime rejected the premises of the Damascus Spring, using 
the usual methods of arrest, trials and imprisonment to quell any opposition.  
Disappointment leads to frustration, which can lead to a social protest 
movement in a country such as Syria where a culture of fear runs deep. Syrian 
society is primarily a young society which, thanks to new communication 
technologies, is now able to maintain contact with the outside world and can 
finally make its voice heard. This is a society capable of positive change 
without the leadership of a patriarchal or totalitarian figure. It is a society 
which feels entirely involved in what has happened in Tunisia and Egypt. It 
has always been at the heart of the Arab world and wishes to remain so while 
at the same time upholding the spirit of freedom and conciliation.  
However, for Syrians, it appears that the path of freedom is beset with 
terror, blood and pain. The past year has clearly brought to light a strong will 
among Syrians to bring down the wall of fear. At the same time, the means of 
bringing about change peacefully and constructively are blocked. Peaceful 
demonstrations, which continue throughout the country, are still being brutally 
repressed. The protest movement has grown increasingly militarized as many 
soldiers, rejecting orders to kill their fellow Syrians, have deserted the national 
military and joined demonstrators. Militarization is undesirable in the abstract 
sense, and it serves the purposes of those who hold the monopoly on violence 
and power – yet the human desire to defend civilians or to avenge one’s own 
people is very understandable. It is thus all the more important that the 
political opposition should manage to circumscribe the military insurrection in 
order to avoid excesses and abuses. In a complex situation, nothing seems 
obvious.  
To overcome the crisis, many attempts are being made on a regional level, 
with diverse initiatives coming from the Arab League. On a broader 
international level, there are declarations, sanctions, meetings and 
condemnations. As violence against civilians continues to grow, the armed 
opposition, formerly exclusively peaceful, is gaining traction. The creation of 
the Free Syrian Army (ALS) is a result of the deteriorating security situation 
and a direct response to the need to protect civilians against the killing 
machine of the state. The activities of the ALS, though, remain disorganized, 
which is hardly surprising considering its composition and due to its scattered 
geographic distribution. Civil resistance, even though it comes at a high price, 
remains the most effective means of overcoming the crisis. The militarization 
of political protest in the 1980s provided all the necessary arguments to crush 
it with unrestrained violence. But the circumstances are different this time, and 
the need for protection is a universal one. Hence, one must accept that the use 
of arms is necessary and unavoidable for some, and in specific situations.  
In parallel, Syrians are thinking about a different future for their country on 
many different levels. To this end, think tanks have been created under 
different banners. The objective is to provide the Syria of the future with 
 concrete and feasible projects. As these developments gain momentum, the 
role of the long neutralized and apolitical Syrian diaspora will grow 
increasingly important. Syrian migrants, until recently concerned primarily with 
family matters and holidays spent in their country, now meet with political 
refugees worldwide to discuss the future of their country. And Syrians in exile 
have also begun to play out a variety of scenarios with experts inside Syria. 
After all, Syria has a considerable human resources potential that has long 
been hollowed out by acute clientelism.  
The near future seems fraught with uncertainties and complexities. But the 
good will needed to restructure the country is gaining momentum. Stability 
and peace for the country’s modern population will require more than the 
introduction of political, constitutional and legal reforms. Indeed, there is an 
urgent need to rebuild a civil society that has for many years been dissolute 
and repressed. Much is being done to reconstruct the notion of citizenship 
eroded by decades of a culture of fear that had turned the inhabitants of this 
country into mere subjects. Restoring the social fabric that has been damaged 
by the revolutionary process – and which so many have tried to destroy – will 
require tremendous effort.  
Ultimately, after one year of conflict, Syrian men and women have come to 
understand they can rely only on themselves and that they should expect 
nothing from the world outside. Thanks to their astonishing tenacity in 
maintaining resistance, continued creativity in devising new forms of protest, 
and relatively stable sense of national unity, they will face the challenges ahead 
in determining their future. 
Was it a surprise?  
Was it a surprise that people poured into the streets demanding an end to 
Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Salih’s rule? No. It was not. The time was ripe 
for such an eruption.  
When the youth demonstrations started in February 2011, after more than 
32 years of Salih’s rule, Yemen was the embodiment of a failed state, ranking 
13th among countries deemed most at risk of failure in the Fund for Peace’s 
2011 Failed State Index. In a country where two-thirds of the population is 
under the age of 24, the unemployment rate was conservatively estimated at 35 
percent; other estimates put the rate at 49 percent. Nearly half the population 
was living under the poverty line, on less than $2 per day. Corruption was 
epidemically rampant. The country ranked 146th out of 179 countries on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2010). Water is 
scarce and the country’s oil resources, which account for two-thirds of public 
revenue and 90 percent of export receipts, have dwindled.  
Certainly, under these circumstances, protest demonstrations and demands 
for change were only to be expected. The time, I repeat, was ripe for such an 
eruption. Not to expect this would have been bizarre.  
What surprised me, however, was the involvement of the youth – their 
pivotal role in shaping the dramatic events that took place in Yemen, as well as 
their determination to stay peaceful. That was a bit of fresh air.  
Few, if any, expected the chain of events that started when Tunisian 
Mohammad Bouazizi set himself on fire on December 17, 2010 – a flame that 
spread from one authoritarian Arab state to another. These countries were 
also ripe for a change. And like their Arab counterparts, Yemeni youth were 
fed up with their corrupt political elites; they wanted change, a future, and 
 wanted it now, in their own country. Just a day after President Ben Ali fled 
Tunisia, young, middle-class, educated Yemenis decided to organize a 
demonstration in front of the French embassy to protest the shameful official 
French position toward the Tunisian uprising. A day later, a huge 
demonstration started at Sana’a University. The uprising was thus launched, 
and spread to other cities in Yemen. 
At this moment, there was again hope in Yemen – something I have long 
missed in my country. I belong to a middle-aged Yemeni generation that lost 
hope, a fact that prompted me and many other educated Yemenis to leave the 
country and build a future elsewhere. And now here I am, meeting a different 
sort of Yemeni youth – educated, determined to make a difference, but in 
their own country. In fact, when I attended a women’s rally at Taghir Square at 
Sana’a University on February 28, 2011, nothing but hope could be sensed.  
Unity was the motto at the time. But at that point, unity was achievable only 
because the rallying cry of toppling the president proved to be so powerful. It 
managed to unify different groups that in other circumstances stand at odds 
with one another. In this case, each joined the movement, but for different 
reasons.  
Even during these days, before the March 19 massacre of protestors in 
Taghir Square, I was pestered by doubts. As a human and a Yemeni I could 
not help but hope; and hope, believe me, is a magical force. But as a social 
scientist, I learned long ago that one cannot cook without the necessary 
ingredients. In the Yemeni case, the necessary ingredients for a stable nation-
state are absent. In fact, the problem with Yemen has to do with the project of 
the state itself.  
In the end, the reality of Yemeni political and social structures rose to take 
over once again, and the expectation that things could indeed change for the 
better faded away. This is in short where we stand today. 
If we try to untangle Yemen’s web of political problems, it becomes clear 
that the country is facing serious concurrent issues:  
First: There is a power struggle among the core ethnic elites who have run 
the country for decades, enabling the president to survive and remain in 
power. Their bickering threatens the stability of the whole system. Over time, 
the state came to represent the interests of a dominant ethnic group (northern 
Zaydi Qahtani of the Hashid tribal confederation), becoming a vehicle for 
safeguarding their ethnic interests. Other social groups were pushed to accept 
the institutional reality of a state that has rarely considered them to be equal 
citizens. The lack of solid institutional foundations made it possible for the 
“ethnicized” elites to hijack the state’s institutions for their benefit. These core 
leaders control among themselves the army and security services. However, 
their solid alliance began to wither at the beginning of 2000, when Salih started 
to groom his son Ahmed as his successor. The youth protests provided a 
golden opportunity to one faction of these core strongmen, the Al-Ahmar 
brothers (the sheiks of the paramount Hashid tribal confederation) and Ali 
Mohsen Al-Ahmar (Salih’s half brother and top military commander). They 
readily joined the youth protestors, and military confrontations followed. 
Ironically, the youth protestors were calling for an end to the Salih regime, but 
found themselves stuck with a situation in which those who decided to join 
and protect them were very much part of that regime. This is one reason why 
the youth project of change ultimately floundered.  
Second: Yemen is not one Yemen. It is many Yemens. And the issue here 
transcends the north-south division. The issue here has to do with the 
statehood projects in both North and South Yemen. The scope of this article 
does not allow this issue to be discussed in depth here. Suffice it to say that 
Yemen is two units, each of which is divided in turn along ethnic lines, a 
situation that led to recurrent violent coups and wars in each region both 
before and after their unification in 1990. More specifically:  
North Yemen has been split along tribal and sectarian lines, among other 
divisions. The most relevant division today is that between Hashimite Zaydis, 
Qahtani Zaydis, Sunni Shafites and Sunni Salafites. 
This division has since 2004 partly expressed itself in the tribal and sectarian 
war of Sada’a, led by the al-Huthi family, and in the current fighting between 
Salafi groups and the Huthis in the northern provinces. The Huthi movement 
has turned the northern Sada’a into a state within a state. Its troops have been 
fighting their way to neighboring governances since the end of 2011 (Haja, 
Amran and Al-Jawf). Some news reports indicate that this fighting is taking 
 place with the blessing of the Yemeni president. It would not be a surprise if 
this turns out to be true. 
Sectarian division has also been obvious in the alienation of the Sunni 
Shafites in the area’s middle regions, specifically in Taiz, Ibb and Al Baida. It 
was no coincidence that many of the youthful students who started the 
protests came from these middle regions! 
South Yemen, on the other hand, has been divided along tribal, regional and 
cultural lines. The most prominent division has been that between the Ad Dali 
and Radfan regions on the one hand, and the Abien and Shabwa regions on 
the other. The region of Hadramout, moreover, has always considered itself a 
separate unit that deserves statehood. The Southern Movement is divided 
between those who demand separation and those who demand a federal 
system. Interestingly, this divergence also falls along regional lines! 
Both the Southern Movement, with its fractured leaderships, and the Zaydi 
Huthi movement supported the youth uprising when it started in February. 
However, the support of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and the al-Ahmar clan has 
increased the influence of Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood Islamists in the sit-
in camps, leading to an end to this cooperation.  
Third: Yemen has always been a weak state. Today the state is not only weak; 
it is on the verge of collapse. North Yemen has struggled to control its 
territory since its inception in 1962. And South Yemeni political elites used 
brutal coercive measures under the socialist system (1967 – 1990) to keep the 
state under control. But the moment the party collapsed, the state apparatus 
toppled with it. Since the 1994 civil war, the weakness of the Yemeni state has 
been its most characteristic feature. The power struggle between core elites, 
the south’s persistent challenges to northern authority in their regions, and the 
on-and-off Huthi rebellion have destabilized the whole system, creating a 
power vacuum. This vacuum has been filled in some parts of the south by 
Islamist terrorists.  
Given the magnitude of Yemen’s problems, I have expressed doubt that the 
Gulf Cooperation Council’s initiative, issued on May 21/22, 2011, which led 
to a presidential inauguration of the former Vice President Hadi, would 
provide Yemen with a safe exit from its explosive situation.1 In fact, I have 
considered it a patchwork solution unable to defuse the crisis either in the 
short or long run. This document treats the Yemeni crisis as a simple conflict 
between two fighting parties and ignores the Huthi and Southern movements. 
Most importantly, it seeks to preserve the status quo within the Yemeni 
political system. This has to do with the leading role played by Saudi Arabia in 
charting the initiative. The kingdom has an interest in preserving the old 
Yemeni system, whose leaders have been its trusted allies despite the tensions 
between the two. The Saudi government also has an interest in hindering real 
political reforms in Yemen, lest this encourage Saudi citizens to demand 
similar actions.  
Yet keeping the status quo is the surest way to impending disaster in Yemen.  
What Yemen needs are serious steps that address the very core of its 
problems: a single ethnic group’s control of the decision-making process and 
the corresponding exclusion of other regional, sectarian and tribal groups; the 
absence of a nation-state that represents all segments of its population; an 
institutional deficit; and a need for real democratic reforms that usher in the 
rule of law and are able to hold state officials accountable. Achieving this will 
require three important steps to be taken:  
 
1 The initiative calls for the Yemeni president to delegate his authorities to his vice 
president, and set a 90-day period within which the vice president is to call presidential 
elections. However, it makes sure there will be only one candidate in the presidential 
election, the vice president. It also holds that after the vice president is “elected” as 
president, he is to be responsible for overseeing a transitional period. The opposition is to 
name a candidate for the position of prime minister, and a "national consensus 
government,” divided on a 50/50 basis between the government and the opposition, is to 
be created. The government is to have the authority to “disengage” the armed forces and 
their rival military forces and send them back to their camps. The government and the 
president are to call for a national dialogue conference, tasked with discussing the Yemeni 
conflicts (including the southern question) in a manner that preserves Yemen’s unity. 
 Demonstrating the will to be part of a nation: The Yemeni state, before and 
after unification, has been perilously weak since its inception. For the country 
to start afresh, its various social groups with their diverse sectarian, regional 
and tribal affiliations have to agree to be part of this nation. They have to want 
to be part of this nation. But if this will is to emerge, the state must guarantee 
equal citizenship to its citizens and must stop acting to safeguard a single 
ethnic group’s interests.  
Creating a federal system: I am of the mind that keeping Yemen unified will 
be less costly than allowing it to separate into different units. To give one 
example, the separation of South Yemen would not mark the end but the 
beginning of southerners’ problems. The divisions within South Yemen would 
come to the fore, which would ultimately divide it into at least three parts. 
From this point of view, a federal system that guarantees regional autonomy, 
prevents the hegemony of one region over others and respects citizens’ rights 
offers a way out of this crisis. The one condition necessary for this step is that 
the various Yemeni social groups must demonstrate a will to be part of this 
federal system. If this is absent, then an orderly separation is warranted.  
Creating a state that functions: The international community would be wise to 
step in and help Yemen build its institutional foundation, strengthen its state’s 
capabilities and achieve conditions of law and order. I am mentioning the 
international community here because Yemen is not in a position to do that 
alone.  
I am well aware that all these steps will be very difficult to achieve. Nobody 
said that the task is simple. A difficult and complex situation requires difficult 
decisions and solutions. And even if this task seems overwhelming, as a 
human and a Yemeni I will never lose sight of the fact that it is we, the 
humans, who can make a difference. 
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 Many Arab states have seen greater political change in the last 15 months 
than in the preceding decades. Largely untouched by the famous third wave of 
democratization, they had been havens of continuity, falsely interpreted as 
stability. However, in late 2010 and early 2011 peaceful popular protests of an 
unprecedented scale spread from Tunisia to most other Arab-speaking 
autocracies. Collective action, despite the various differences in terms of initial 
demands, extent, intensity, actors and forms, expressed long-standing 
grievances that could not be effectively expressed or addressed under 
authoritarian rule. Within two months, the seemingly irremovable presidents 
of Tunisia and Egypt resigned, the former after some twenty-five years in 
office, the latter after thirty years. A few months later, their Libyan counterpart 
was overthrown after more than forty years of basically undivided rule. Even 
in the largely calm oil monarchies in the Gulf, tensions rose as discontent 
repeatedly generated public protests; a number of demonstrations took place 
in parts of Saudi Arabia while a sustained popular movement developed in 
Bahrain. Political regimes had not faced challenges or undergone 
transformations of similar importance since the “socialist” revolutions of the 
1950s and 1960s that had brought to power Gamal Abd al-Nasser in Egypt 
and the Ba’thist rulers of Iraq and Syria. Similar popular contestation at a 
regional scale had not been seen since the period of decolonization when 
protests against foreign domination occurred roughly simultaneously in 
various Arab states.  
From the outset, actors and observers alike have referred to the protests as 
revolutions, sometimes even as one single Arab revolution reminiscent of the 
“Arab revolt” that a century ago contributed to the defeat of the Ottomans. 
Others more cautiously preferred to interpret developments as belated 
transitions to democracy that would finally bring an end to the “Arab 
exceptionalism” that for decades had delayed the advent of the democratic 
end of history. Both readings may ultimately be borne out by events as 
revolutions and transitions frequently take years to unfold; however, they may 
also overemphasize change where important continuities persist. The most 
palpable revolution so far has occurred at the level of individuals who 
transformed themselves from subjects into citizens, ready and able to take 
their destiny into their own hands. Politically, however, most of the 
“revolutions” remain unaccomplished and the transitions partial or blocked at 
best. The question therefore arises whether recent changes and likely future 
developments should at all be examined from these perspectives.  
In any event, the prospects for democratic government and good 
governance in the Arab world need to be discussed on the basis of 
developments on the ground and against the backdrop of the history and 
conditions of each of the countries concerned. The rapid spread of 
contestation across state boundaries should not obscure important differences 
among and even within these countries. The different ways in which the 
incumbents responded to the protests and the equally diverse political 
dynamics that they have generated point to the limited validity of the domino 
metaphor and the underlying assumption that the stakes were the same 
everywhere. Contestation in one country spread to other countries because it 
spoke to constituencies that felt unable to effectively voice their grievances 
and seek redress under authoritarian rule. Nonetheless, beyond this common 
denominator and a number of other similarities, neither the grievances nor 
their effects were identical, once they became articulated in public. The extent 
and the forms of protest have varied from country to country, and so has their 
impact on the various forms of authoritarian rule prevailing in the region. 
These differences may appear more distinctly over time as diverging dynamics 
of regime transformation and governance progressively unfold and take shape. 
Recognizing that the history and conditions of each country are reflected in 
recent and future developments does not, however, enable us to predict 
outcomes. It only allows us to identify scenarios that are more likely than 
others but that may still unfold with the same degree of probability. 
 In order to discuss the different trajectories of events it appears useful to 
make a first and basic distinction between: (1) countries in which large-scale 
peaceful contestation has entailed major forms of regime transformation 
without foreign intervention; (2) others where limited contestation has led to 
equally limited adjustments; (3) yet others where prolonged contestation has 
not (yet) shown similar results or (4) the impasse has been resolved by foreign 
intervention; and (5) countries where contestation has remained narrowly 
circumscribed if at all it occurred, and political regimes remained basically 
untouched.  
So far, Tunisia is the country where the transition from authoritarian rule in 
the wake of large-scale collective action is most advanced. The new political 
order epitomized by the Constituent Assembly, elected in October 2011 in the 
first competitive elections for decades, may well develop into that of a fully 
fledged liberal democracy where the rulers are chosen by the ruled and where 
positive liberties are continuously guaranteed by negative liberties. The 
absence of an overall winner in the elections and the power-sharing agreement 
reached by three of the major parties, including the Islamist Ennahda party, 
bode well for the dual institutionalization of competition and cooperation that 
characterizes democracies. 
However, the demise of the leaders and institutions of the ancien régime has 
not (yet) prompted the departure or complete marginalization of its many 
supporters in the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the police. Incidentally, only 
the major representatives of the former regime party, the Neo-Destour, are 
prevented from running for election. The armed forces undoubtedly pushed 
former president Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali to step down and leave the country. 
However, little else is known about them except for their relatively small size, 
which may prevent them from opposing a government or regime that enjoys 
popular legitimacy. To an extent, the question is whether the new Tunisia will 
resemble Germany after World War I, when remnants of the authoritarian 
Empire contributed to the disintegration of the Weimar republic, or whether it 
will resemble the Federal Republic, which more efficiently marginalized 
remnants of the Nazi regime, though largely thanks to the winners of World 
War II.  
At present, the former representatives and other advocates of the old order 
may be no more than a nuisance power with little appeal among the broader 
population that the law enforcement agencies of the new regime can keep in 
check. The same applies to new forces that are ambiguous about the merits of 
democracy, most notably Salafis in and around the Tahrir Party (which has no 
link to Tahrir Square in Cairo other than linguistic) who are not represented in 
the Constituent Assembly. However, even nuisance powers are able to 
sabotage and derail institutional reforms and policies. The future influence of 
both categories of actors will also depend on the extent to which the new 
regime is able to meet the demands and expectations of a population that is 
growing increasingly diverse, economically and socially. Input legitimacy 
inherent in the democratic aspects of the new regime will have to be matched 
by output legitimacy and, thus, by policies that cater to the interests of the 
majority, or to those of constituencies that are sufficiently strong to insure the 
stability of the new regime.  
Only 15 months after the departure of Ben Ali there is reasonable hope that 
Tunisia is closer to the Federal than to the Weimar Republic. It is nonetheless 
too early to tell whether the balance of power between the advocates and 
opponents of democracy has definitely been tipped in favor of the former. 
Nor have the new institutions yet been tested to the extent that they could be 
considered sufficiently consolidated to transform political conflict lastingly 
into democratic competition. 
In Egypt, the transition from authoritarian rule remains more tentative, 
patchy and uncertain than in Tunisia. To date, the departure of president 
Hosni Mubarak, his friends and family, and the decision to disband the 
National Democratic Party have not entailed the departure of other 
components of the ancien régime. This applies in particular to the armed 
forces which have dominated politics since the Free Officers around Gamal 
Abd al-Nasser took power in 1952. They remain the most powerful political 
actor even though Nasser’s successors, Anwar al-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, 
themselves military officers, increasingly tried to strengthen the police and 
various secret services as countervailing powers. The armed forces still control 
 a sizeable part of the Egyptian economy and continue to draw considerable 
legitimacy from the wars they fought, in particular the 1973 October War that 
ultimately enabled Egypt to regain control of the Sinai peninsula. In contrast, 
the Tunisian armed forces never engaged in the sort of military action that 
could have made them appear as the saviors of the nation. For decades they 
have been sidelined by the police and the secret services through which 
president Ben Ali rose to power. Faced with contestation and disorder they 
had no particular reason to side with the old regime.  
So far in Egypt the domestic balance of power has not tilted towards the 
advocates of a radically new political order. Though weakened by its clumsy 
exercise of power since February 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF) chaired by Field Marshal Muhammad Husayn Tantawi, 
Mubarak’s long serving minister of defense, continues to monopolize the 
means of coercion and control vast economic (and other) resources to 
influence the course of events. Though preferably outside the limelight, the 
officers no doubt seek to defend for many years to come not only the 
economic interests of the armed forces which control important industries, 
but also their numerous other privileges, political influence, and the vision of 
Egypt as a regional power strengthened by conservative moral values, a 
relatively egalitarian social contract and nationalist ideology.  
The sustained large-scale protests that took place in January and February 
2011 in and around Tahrir Square in Cairo, in Alexandria, in Suez and in other 
cities prompted the military commanders to withdraw their support from 
President Mubarak, himself a former air force officer. In their eyes, his failure 
to defuse the protests threatened the survival of the entire regime. His 
attempts to pass power on to his son Gamal further alienated the armed forces 
who had no sympathies for the person and his economic reforms that collided 
with their interests. As Egypt’s dependency on external actors, in particular the 
United States, and possible sympathies for the protesters among the lower 
ranks of the armed forces and among the conscripts ruled out repression, the 
only viable option consisted in controlled political reforms and attempts to 
build a new coalition of political forces willing to accept the privileged position 
of the military.  
The limited amendments to the old constitution put to referendum in March 
2011 confirmed the preponderant role of the SCAF in the transition to a new 
political order. Attempts to restrict the powers of the new parliament (elected 
in late 2011 and early 2012) to shape the new constitution and the transition 
process more generally reflect similar concerns to avoid any form of 
“democratic slippage.” The major winners of the parliamentary elections, the 
Muslim Brothers, who (together with smaller allies who had joined their list) 
obtained some 47 percent of the seats in the People’s Assembly (at the 
moment of writing the largely consultative Upper House was not elected yet), 
seem ready to enter into a tactical alliance with the officers and trade their own 
participation in the exercise of power for continued, if indirect, military 
dominance. The Muslim Brothers are clearly aware of the unequal balance of 
power between themselves and the military, but feel that it still affords them a 
unique chance to increase their political influence and powers of patronage. 
The position of junior partner moreover allows them to avoid full political 
responsibility in a period marked by serious economic challenges related to the 
transition. To an extent, the alliance with the officers is facilitated by their 
roughly similar social origins and moral conservatism. This alliance will 
nonetheless be subject to continuous distrust and to disagreements about 
future economic policies, an area where the Muslim Brothers emphasize the 
role of the market while the officers defend state intervention and a strong 
public sector.  
The arrangement may also be challenged, perhaps even violently, by less 
amenable Muslim Brothers and other political forces, in particular those at the 
origin of the 2011 protests. However, these other political forces are highly 
fragmented and deeply divided. Parties and deputies representing the initiators 
of the February protests obtained no more than a single digit fraction of the 
vote and would have to continue demonstrations and other forms of action 
outside the new institutions. Most parties have found it difficult to compete 
with the Muslim Brothers, who have been known to the population for 
decades, suffered at the hands of the previous regime, nonetheless 
transformed networks of support into an impressive political machine, and 
collected large amounts of funds through these networks inside the country 
and among Egyptian labor migrants. No less importantly, the Muslim Brothers 
defend conservative values and speak a language closer to that of the majority 
 of the population. Often critical of the Muslim Brothers, the Salafis of the Nur 
Party, who obtained some 25 percent of the seats (again including smaller 
allies who had joined their list), may occasionally or ultimately side with the 
non-Islamist opposition, but they appear undecided, partly divided and, 
moreover, ambiguous as to the merits of democracy. Like the Muslim 
Brothers, the Nur Party can rely on strong and large networks of support that 
its members have built over the years to distribute among the needy funds that 
they have collected among the wealthier. They thereby succeeded in spreading 
a moral message which, after the fall of Mubarak, could easily be used to 
mobilize political support. Such uncertainties notwithstanding, the electoral 
legitimacy of the Muslim Brothers and the coercive power of the armed forces 
may form the basis for a “historical compromise” of undetermined duration 
that both sides could use to find additional support through patronage and co-
optation. In the short- and medium-term, Egypt may indeed feature the traits 
of a deficient democracy reminiscent of Turkey after the 1980 military coup or 
Chile after the official end to military rule.  
Morocco and Jordan form the second group of countries where the 
monarchies managed to absorb more limited contestation by moderate 
adjustments that reconfigure or “upgrade” authoritarian rule. Less extensive 
and less intense than in Tunisia and Egypt, contestation could be channeled 
into policy changes that address a variety of socioeconomic grievances and 
new constitutional provisions that strengthen (or in the case of Jordan are 
supposed to strengthen) elected bodies and the judiciary without endangering 
the preponderant role of the rulers. For instance, under the new Moroccan 
constitution, the king remains the “Commander of the Faithful,” a position 
that invests him with religious legitimacy and the capacity to circumvent other 
provisions of the constitution in complete legality. Similarly, the president of 
the council of ministers (as the new constitution renames the former prime 
minister) presides over cabinet meetings only as long as the agenda does not 
include security and strategic issues. By implication, the domestic balance of 
power has not been redressed in favor of the forces of contestation. The limits 
to both contestation and adjustments seem to confirm the advantages not of 
monarchies per se, but of monarchies endowed with mechanisms of popular 
representation. The latter translate into legitimacy and co-optation gains that 
allow these monarchies to contain demands for broader change and to avoid 
substantial regime transformation prompted by positive responses to these 
demands or by rifts among their own supporters (see below). 
The cases discussed so far differ from a third group of countries where 
contestation, though strong and sustained, has so far failed to entail the 
transformation of political regimes. In Yemen and Syria protests continue to 
face severe repression, a fact that in both countries pushed small minorities of 
opponents and army deserters to switch to armed forms of resistance. To the 
extent that the rulers have announced “reforms,” they remain rhetorical or 
devoid of substance, such as is the case with the official end to the state of 
emergency decreed by Bashar al-Asad in Syria. In Yemen, the ultimate 
departure of president Ali Abdallah Salih does not necessarily weaken his 
associates and allies, including his son and other family members who control 
a large part of the “security” services. At the moment of writing, the 
opposition in both countries seems to lack the strength to unseat the rulers 
who, in turn, seem to lack the strength to crush the opposition. The internal 
balance of power has no doubt changed to the advantage of the opponents in 
the sense that they are managing to pose a serious challenge to the rulers, but 
it has not changed to the extent that it would enable them to turn the tables on 
their adversaries.  
Depending on the material, symbolical and moral resources available to the 
protagonists, the stalemate may continue for a considerable length of time 
until one or both sides are exhausted. Obviously, scorched earth policies, 
continued harsh repression, and the punitive disruption of food, drinking 
water and medical supplies may precipitate the defeat of the opposition. In the 
case of Syria, international sanctions may weaken the ruling group over time, 
though probably only once they are implemented by all neighbors and major 
global players. If in any of the two countries the rulers ride it out and defeat 
the opposition, they may at some stage concede a degree of political 
decompression to avoid future uprisings and regain the favors of the 
international community. Needless to say, after the defeat of the opposition 
any such decompression would only perpetuate authoritarian rule. In the event 
of a rift within the ruling group or the simultaneous exhaustion of both 
conflicting parties, a historical compromise and power-sharing agreement may 
pave the way to a new political order. However, even then, opposition from 
 extremists on both sides may result in continued conflict, though with the 
battle lines partly redrawn. In the event of their outright defeat, the present 
rulers of Syria and Yemen may face a fate similar to that of Muammar al-
Qadhafi in Libya. Since they belong to a different sub-state solidarity group 
than the majority of their opponents, their demise may precipitate that of the 
entire group. In both countries many participant actors have increasingly come 
to see their conflict as one opposing such groups defined by family, tribal, 
linguistic and religious terms. In Syria the fall of the Alawite rulers around 
Bashar al-Asad may entail the social, economic and political marginalization of 
the Alawites at large, if not worse. The fact that the current ruling groups 
represent some members of this faith rather than all may easily be forgotten. 
In Yemen, so-called tribal dynamics could spell similar trouble for the 
associates of (former) president Ali Abdallah Salih. Only if the conflict parties 
manage to reach a power-sharing agreement will there be the opportunity for 
the future regime to be built on more than co-optation for the winners and 
repression for the losers.  
Developments in Bahrain and Libya illustrate a fourth trajectory which may 
also be seen as a variation on the aforementioned one. Unlike in Syria and 
Yemen, decisive foreign intervention in support of one of the sides has at least 
temporarily brought an end to the conflict between advocates and opponents 
of the status quo. In Bahrain, the arrival of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
troops led by Saudi Arabia consolidated the embattled monarchy; in Libya the 
intervention by NATO forces brought about the end of the Qadhafi regime. 
Societal cleavages as deep as in Syria and Yemen separated the rulers of Libya 
from large parts of the population and continue to do so in Bahrain. Narrow 
family, so-called tribal and regional ties provided the social basis for the 
Qadhafi regime, while the Bahraini monarchy continues to stake its future on 
support from the Sunni minority, thus marginalizing the country’s vast Shi’i 
majority. The conclusions of an official inquiry ordered by the king and 
chaired by a reputable international lawyer that were published in November 
2011 could be critical of government repression precisely because the regime 
felt relatively secure again.  
Although in Libya the domestic balance of power has been reversed in favor 
of those who fought Muammar al-Qadhafi, their coalition remains fragmented 
while supporters of the old regime may regroup. Above and beyond 
ideological differences, the population at large is divided into solidarity groups 
based on regional, family and tribal identities similar to those that supported 
the old regime. These divisions are reflected in the composition and workings 
of the National Transition Council which, for the time being, remains the 
highest political authority in the land. The old regime represented some of 
these groups who obviously continue to command the loyalty of their 
members, even though they have lost their privileged access to power and 
resources. In their eyes, the new regime lacks legitimacy, a deficiency that is 
exacerbated by the means of coercion that they continue to control. Under 
these conditions, post-conflict efforts at state-building will face tremendous 
challenges. The success of such efforts will depend on the extent to which 
they cater to the interests of all or the strategically most important groups. 
Rents may help to erect co-optation into the main pillar of the new political 
order. Since co-optation is likely to involve groups as much as individuals, the 
new political order is likely to feature consociational traits, however informal 
they may be. Such efforts may also fail and further deepen societal cleavages, 
with outcomes ranging from continuous tension between the various groups 
to open civil war. The latter is all the more likely as alleged supporters of the 
old regime are being marginalized or persecuted while the country is awash 
with weapons and the various groups compete for rents. Put differently, a new 
Iraq may be in the making. In the only country apart from Tunisia where 
events put in motion by popular contestation led to the complete demise of 
the ancien régime, the future remains undecided.  
The fifth trajectory is that of most GCC states and Algeria, where 
contestation has been narrowly circumscribed if not almost absent. All 
countries in this group are major oil and gas exporters, even though the cases 
of Libya and, to a lesser extent, Bahrain illustrate that not all major rentier 
states have been immune to contestation. Bahrain is a special case insofar as it 
now lives primarily on the recycling of rents accruing to its neighbors and 
therefore faces additional challenges to its welfare regime. In both Bahrain and 
Libya, cleavages between solidarity groups based on strong sub-state identities 
over-determined relations between the rulers and many of their subjects and 
thus counterbalanced the soothing effects of rents. Another exception, 
Kuwait, did experience contestation but largely as part and parcel of a conflict 
 that for decades has opposed the ruling Sabah family to the advocates of 
constitutional monarchy.  
Contestation related to the Arab Spring has also been narrowly 
circumscribed in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine where conditions in critical 
aspects differ from those prevailing in the other Arab countries. Neither the 
Lebanese nor the Iraqis live under authoritarian rule, even though they suffer 
from various and serious restrictions on positive and negative liberties. From a 
formal and procedural point of view both states are democracies, obviously 
with significant shortcomings and deficiencies. Their parliaments, 
governments and presidents are elected, and recent elections have changed 
parliamentary majorities and the composition of governments. Protests mainly 
focused on the inefficiencies of government and the absence of good 
governance rather than on the nature of the political regime. At the same time, 
the consociational aspects of political representation and of the exercise of 
power frequently prevent mobilization from reaching parts of the population 
that feel represented, protected and able to influence decisions. In Palestine, 
finally, the authoritarian exercise of power by the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip appears 
closely linked to the intrinsically authoritarian nature of Israeli occupation and 
encirclement. In the three cases, contestation has been a permanent feature of 
politics not only over the past 15 months but for years and decades, only 
partly affected by recent events in other Arab countries.  
In Palestine, the Arab Spring may ultimately entail a greater degree of unity 
and cooperation between the PNA and (parts of) Hamas, partly in response to 
protests against the current divisions and stalemate, but largely as a 
consequence of developments in other Arab countries. Hamas, for instance, 
appears to draw comfort from the performance of the Muslim Brothers in the 
Egyptian elections and is yet weakened by the exacerbating conflict in Syria, 
two contradictory developments that both push it to mend fences with the 
PNA. 
Contestation from below, responses from above and regime transformations 
in the various Arab countries correlate with a number of societal, economic 
and political features some of which have already been referred to. These 
correlations in turn suggest some causal relationships that by and large reflect 
processes of state formation and other long-term historical processes. To the 
extent that they explain events since December 2010, they also provide some 
indication as to how far transformation processes are likely to take political 
regimes on the road to democracy and good governance.  
The countries where discontent has failed to translate into effective 
contestation and those where protests were contained by the expansion of 
welfare provision are all major oil and gas producers. The correlation thus 
tends to confirm traditional assumptions about the political effects of rents 
which enable rulers to pursue expansionary budget policies and thus alleviate 
socioeconomic grievances on the one hand and develop mechanisms of 
control and repression on the other (Beblawi an Luciani 1987; Ross 2001, as 
opposed to Herb 2005). In spite of various limitations and hesitations, oil-
producing countries have adopted such policies for decades. From the early 
days of the protests, the swift increase in subsidies, new cash payouts, and the 
creation of tens of thousands of new jobs in government administrations no 
doubt further stabilized the regimes. In Algeria, memories of the civil war that 
followed the aborted elections of 1992 may also have reduced readiness to 
challenge the rulers. The soothing effects of expansionary budgetary policies 
have also been reinforced by repression, by limited “authoritarian upgrading,” 
or any combination thereof. Developments in Algeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates amply illustrate variations on this theme. The 
argument may hold some truth even for Sudan, even though the roughly 
simultaneous accession to independence of its southern parts have created a 
quite unique situation.  
The countries where rents failed to stabilize incumbents and regimes differ 
from the others in at least two important ways. Though a member of the 
GCC, Bahrain balanced limited oil reserves with sophisticated service 
industries and thus largely turned into an indirect rentier state. Moreover, in 
 Bahrain and in Libya, populations are deeply divided into sub-state solidarity 
groups built on family, tribal or religious ties. In both cases, power and income 
from hydrocarbon resources have been distributed unevenly, especially in 
Bahrain where the Shi’i majority is heavily disadvantaged in both respects. In 
both cases, however, foreign intervention has played a crucial role in 
perpetuating or toppling the regime in place. Qadhafi fell as a result of NATO 
intervention, whereas King Hamad of Bahrain consolidated his position 
thanks to the arrival of Saudi troops.  
None of the other rentier states are as internally divided and are therefore in 
a far better position to avoid massive popular contestation. With some 
exceptions, protests in Saudi Arabia have remained circumscribed 
geographically. Although they have in part reflected the concerns of sub-state 
solidarity groups such as the Shi’is in the eastern parts of the country, they 
have mobilized altogether smaller sections of the population than in Libya and 
Bahrain.  
In the countries where contestation has remained limited and yielded no 
more than the upgrading of authoritarianism, rulers not only derive their 
legitimacy from sources other than popular choice but also rely on 
representative institutions and mechanisms that allow them to deflect 
criticism. In Morocco and Jordan, authoritarian monarchies have promulgated 
constitutions that, without transforming them into constitutional monarchies 
in the narrow sense, provide for a degree of popular representation. In 
Morocco such representation – already prior to the recent demonstrations – 
bordered on participation and co-decision powers in some policy areas; the 
amendments to the constitution that were introduced in 2011 in order to 
diffuse the protests further strengthen these participatory features while 
containing them within limits compatible with the authoritarian exercise of 
power by the king. Elections and parliaments with limited effects and powers 
not only postpone the moment when discontent turns into protests; as easy 
targets they also absorb both and thus shield the unelected seat of power. The 
Jordanian example shows that even prime ministers and governments that are 
responsible to the king rather than to parliament may serve as protective fuses 
as long as it is understood that their term in office may be terminated in 
response to popular discontent. Even in Kuwait, where voters and deputies 
tend to present their demands forcefully, the very existence of a representative 
parliament may afford the ruling Sabah family a permanently renewable lease 
of life.  
The creation of institutions and mechanisms able to deflect criticism is a 
possibility that is not open to all authoritarian regimes. Only monarchies may 
allow parliaments and even governments to be elected in ways that somehow 
reflect the preferences of the voters simply because the powers of these 
institutions always remain subordinate to those of the unelected sovereign. In 
contrast, the continuity of authoritarian rule in republics crucially depends on 
heavily rigged elections or even elections without choice. Unlike in 
monarchies, the head of state himself or herself derives his or her legitimacy 
from the people and therefore needs to be elected. However, not all 
authoritarian monarchies have tried or managed to establish institutions that 
would shield them against unrest. The representative bodies created or slightly 
strengthened by some GCC rulers in the 1990s have remained too obviously 
dominated by the monarchs to play such a role.  
All countries where strong and sustained popular contestation has been met 
by violent and sustained repression display deep societal cleavages that pit 
against each other sub-state solidarity groups with differential access to power 
and resources. In fact, prolonged and violent domestic conflict has rattled all 
countries displaying such divisions, except where groups considering 
themselves disadvantaged are relatively small in numbers or weak. In Bahrain 
and Libya the continued dialectics of protests and repression have only been 
disrupted by decisive foreign intervention. In the absence of such intervention 
the impasse in Syria and Yemen may continue for a prolonged period of time. 
Contestation and its transforming effects also seem to differ in line with the 
broader nature of the state as shaped by long-term processes of state 
formation. Both Tunisia and Egypt, where peaceful large-scale contestations 
have led to major regime transformations (in Tunisia arguably a new political 
regime), come closer than most other Arab states to the ideal type of the 
nation-state defined as a political arena whose boundaries coincide with those 
of an imagined community commanding the ultimate loyalty of its members. 
For centuries, the successive masters of both countries have ruled over 
roughly the same territory and population and thus been able to pursue not 
 only state but also nation-building strategies with some degree of success. 
These strategies have reduced internal divides or contained their disruptive 
effects even though the mutual alienation between Christians and Muslims in 
Egypt illustrates their possible failure. In contrast, Libya, Syria and Yemen are 
territorial states that mainly claim or aspire to be nation-states (Korany 1987). 
They are not only deeply divided internally (as already pointed out); sometimes 
also their external borders have been redrawn substantially, which further 
complicates the imagination and building of a community of solidarity 
coextensive with the population of the state (Kienle 1990).  
In the case of Syria in particular, internal divides based on family, religious, 
linguistic and regional criteria are paralleled by cross-border solidarities based 
on the same ascriptive criteria. The Syrian Druze, for instance, have close ties 
with the Druze in Lebanon and even in Israel. Populations in the Euphrates 
valley and the eastern desert have equally close family and so-called tribal ties 
with their neighbors in Iraq. These and other cross-border solidarities are 
older than the borders of the Syrian state that were drawn in various stages 
after the end of World War I. They persist because, over decades, first the 
French mandatory power then the governments of independent Syria, all for 
reasons of their own, avoided or neglected sustained nation-building efforts.  
In territorial states like Syria, conflict over power and resources easily 
develops into a more basic and severe conflict between identity groups. In the 
case of political entities closer to the nation-state, model contestation and 
repression target members of the same imagined community rather than 
“others” and therefore tend to be less violent. In Egypt, for instance, the use 
of excessive force by the police and armed forces caused numerous deaths and 
injuries over the past year but never reached the level of violence currently 
seen in Syria.  
The argument may also apply to Morocco and provide an additional 
explanation for the peaceful nature of contestation and regime response in the 
kingdom. Morocco is not only a monarchy endowed with the representative 
mechanisms referred to above but also by and large a historically consolidated 
entity that like Tunisia and Egypt comes close to the nation-state model. 
Though rationalized as an act of national reunification, the occupation and 
annexation of the formerly Spanish Sahara took place at a moment when 
Morocco was already largely consolidated as a state and as an imagined 
community. Unlike in Bahrain, societal divides never prevented the however 
selective and differential incorporation of different solidarity groups into the 
state. Tamazight (Berber) has been recognized as a second official language 
rather late, but some of those who speak it as their mother tongue have for 
long played an important role in the administration and in the armed forces. 
Differences among the countries concerned should not obscure important 
similarities that have also affected recent events. With regard to protests and 
regime transformation, such similarities are strongly suggested by their roughly 
simultaneous eruption in a fair number of Arab states with visible ripple 
effects in the others. Explanations based exclusively on the contagion effect of 
contestation encapsulated in the domino metaphor appear to be incomplete. 
They cannot explain why the various authoritarian regimes had been weakened 
to the extent that contagion could fall on fertile grounds. Above and beyond 
their diversity, the various country trajectories converge to the extent that 
these regimes over decades prevented discontent from being articulated 
effectively and alleviated through appropriate policy changes. The similarity 
thus resides in the ultimate and simultaneous failure of the authoritarian 
regimes to absorb, deflect or oppose pressures from “below.” Nor should 
grievances specific to certain countries hide the fact that other sources of 
discontent were more commonly shared. In Syria for instance, the societal 
cleavages between the mainly Alawite rulers and the majority of the mainly 
non-Alawite (largely but not exclusively Sunni) ruled have affected the course 
of events at various stages and levels. However, like in Egypt and elsewhere, 
contestation in Syria has also reflected the socioeconomic concerns of a 
variety of constituencies, and considerably so.  
The Bertelsmann Transformation Index’s (BTI) time-series show that with 
the exception of Tunisia, in all countries where major protests have taken 
place, the overall economic performance remained constant or moderately 
improved over the past decade. At least subjectively, though, not everybody in 
these countries benefited from the improvements to the same extent or at 
least was insured against losses and decline. Independently of how people 
looked at their own destiny, as far as Arab countries are concerned, the 
calculation of Gini coefficients has been at best patchy and intermittent. More 
 importantly, discontent has been rife not only among the losers but also 
among many winners of the economic reforms that have been implemented 
since the late 1980s. If in some places and at some moments protests have 
primarily mobilized the poor, the marginalized and the downwardly mobile, 
other demonstrations and gatherings have mobilized the better-off and social 
climbers (Bayat 2011). The initial protests in Sidi Bouzid in December 2010 
and those in Suez a month later largely represented the former, but the large 
demonstrations on Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis and Tahrir Square in Cairo 
that brought down Ben Ali and Mubarak included many of the latter. There is 
a Tocquevillian dimension to many of the protests in the sense that the 
upwardly mobile no longer accepted that authoritarian rulers and crony 
capitalists denied them access to markets and decision-making. They were 
even less ready to countenance regression as illustrated by the heavily rigged 
parliamentary elections in Egypt in autumn 2010 and another glorious “re-
election” of Ben Ali in Tunisia. As the BTI also shows, regression or 
stagnation (which from a dynamic point of view comes down to regression) 
marked political transformation in most Arab countries over the past few 
years; the slight improvements at a low level of advancement that the index 
records with regard to Syria and Libya is not incompatible with an important 
gap between reality and expectations. Rather than growing poverty, 
impoverishment and decline, the protests thus more broadly reflect the 
inability of the authoritarian regimes to respond to the needs and wishes of 
increasingly socially diverse populations. They remind us of the mismatch 
between political institutions on the one hand and economic and social change 
on the other that Samuel Huntington considered a key challenge to existing 
forms of political order (Huntington 1968). As for the growing social and 
sociological diversity of the populations, it cannot be disassociated from 
developments such as the growth of the private sector, the related increase in 
income differentials, and the intensification of ties with the outside world that 
are part and parcel of policies of external and internal economic liberalization 
and ultimately of broader global transformations. One might be tempted to 
embrace modernization theory if it were not tainted by dubious teleological 
claims or the equally problematic distinction between modernity and tradition.  
In light of the increasing alienation between the rulers and the ruled, and the 
increasing importance of global standards as a reference at home, the many 
efforts by Mubarak, Ben Ali, Qadhafi and Salih to promote the political and 
business careers of their sons and family members became all the more 
problematic. Among the ruled, attempts to establish monarchical republics 
where power would be passed on from father to son no doubt challenged 
considerations not only of interest but also of dignity (El-Meehy 2011). 
The prospects for good governance as a process of decision-making and 
implementation which, according to one definition need to be accountable, 
transparent, responsive, equitable and inclusive, effective and efficient, 
participatory, respectful of the rule of law and consensus-oriented, necessarily 
need to be discussed with regard not only to procedure and outputs but also 
to inputs. Phrased differently, good governance depends as much on the 
opportunities offered to the addressees of public policies to participate in their 
design as it depends on the intrinsic quality of these policies and the 
procedures governing their production and implementation. The promotion 
of due diligence and the fight against corruption are aspects of good 
governance but cannot sum it up.  
Ultimately, forms of governance are closely related to the nature of political 
regimes as even the World Bank once conceded (World Bank 1991). Thus, 
authoritarian regimes can hardly compete with functioning democracies on the 
input side where participation matters. However, the picture is far more 
blurred on the output side since, for instance, effective policies designed 
without participation may more adequately reflect demands than policies 
based on participation that are poorly implemented.  
In the new, more participatory regimes in the Arab world, governance is 
likely to become more complex than it was under their authoritarian 
predecessors. The number of demands and inputs may rise sharply as citizens 
can make their voices be heard more easily and elect representatives to defend 
their causes. By implication, inputs will be more diverse than they had been in 
the past or will at least come from different social backgrounds. This 
notwithstanding, the objectives and contents of public policies may show a 
 degree of continuity as participatory decision-making or new dominant forces 
may confirm policy choices made previously by authoritarian fiat. For 
instance, voters may seek to perpetuate out of their personal interest subsidies 
that authoritarian rulers decreed in order to buy popular support. 
However, in line with the above caveat, improvements of governance on the 
input side will not necessarily be reflected in the intrinsic quality of public 
policies and their responsiveness to given needs or demands. Far less progress 
should be expected in countries that continue to suffer from authoritarian rule 
which, in the Arab countries, moreover displays strong patrimonial features. 
There will likely be no progress at all in countries like Syria and Libya where 
the future of the political regime as such remains an open question; rather, 
continued conflict and uncertainty will entail deteriorating standards of 
governance. No doubt the BTI Management Index will trace these 
developments in detail and enable us to assess retrospectively such guarded 
pessimism.  
In Tunisia and in Egypt, where the transition from authoritarian rule is most 
advanced, policy-making may be expected to reflect a greater degree of 
participation and therefore more diverse inputs. Clearly, public debates and 
parliaments are marked by greater pluralism than in the past; in Tunisia the 
coalition government further increases the likelihood of diverging inputs 
reaching decision makers. Nonetheless, a number of important caveats apply. 
In Egypt, public debate has already been relatively open even under the ancien 
régime, unlike in Tunisia. Conversely, in Egypt, the new parliament is more 
clearly dominated by an identifiable majority than in Tunisia, and so may be 
the new government. Despite their numbers, civil society organizations 
unaffiliated to political parties are still relatively weak in both countries, even 
though they have enjoyed greater (but nonetheless limited) freedom under 
Mubarak than under Ben Ali. Their relative weakness may ultimately prevent a 
meaningful and effective participation of organized and concerned groups and 
citizens in the policy-making process.  
The greater freedom of public debate does not ipso facto entail additional 
quality of debate. Economic debates, for instance, continue to pit against each 
other protagonists of far-reaching economic reforms inspired by neoclassical 
and neoliberal textbooks on the one hand and nostalgia for state-led 
development of the 1950s and 1960s on the other. In social matters, advocates 
of the minimalist state oppose defenders of the old social contract as it existed 
in the heydays of state-led development. Currently, fashionable debates about 
a “social market economy” and an “Islamic economy” are extremely general 
and basically converge towards equally general proposals aimed at some sort 
of regulation of the market. Decades of authoritarianism have stifled 
intellectual debate, pushed thinkers and activists into exile, and left the 
remaining ones with the impression that they would never be heard which, in 
turn, discouraged them from developing viable projects and alternatives.  
In both countries, the objectives and contents of future public policies 
necessarily depend on the relative strength of political forces in parliament, but 
also on the strength of extra-parliamentary actors such as the military on the 
one hand and groups that try to push their demands from forums such as 
Tahrir Square on the other. Public policies are likely to be legitimated 
increasingly with regard to values that the mainly Islamist winners of the 
recent parliamentary elections consider Islamic. However, it must be borne in 
mind that the old regimes already tended to legitimate numerous decisions 
with reference to their own interpretation of Islam, in part to fight their 
Islamist challengers with their own weapons. Thus, on paper at least, Shari’ah 
law has for long been the major source of legislation in Egypt, even though it 
remained undefined and its actual impact has also been limited to a few areas 
such as personal status law. In the future, differences about the definition of 
Islamic values are likely to prompt numerous debates among Islamists of 
different shades and allow for a variety outcomes and alliances with non-
Islamists. This applies in particular to Tunisia where members of the Ennahda 
party occupy less than forty percent of seats in parliament. However, it also 
applies to Egypt where the Muslim Brothers, the Salafist Nur Party and other 
Islamists obtained a combined 70 percent of seats, but partly differ in language 
and in interests.  
Although basically all Islamists are morally conservative, they disagree 
among themselves with regard to important issues such as the rights of 
women. Their shared claim that an Islamic economy is a regulated market 
economy cannot hide important differences as to the forms and degrees of 
regulation which in turn entail different balances of power between the market 
 and the state. At present, the leaders of the Islamist parties by and large 
emphasize the role of markets more than that of the state. However, pressures 
from among their own electorate may push them to opt for more substantial 
state intervention, in some cases even the redistribution of wealth.  
Most other political forces in the two parliaments are also morally 
conservative and defend various incarnations of the regulated market 
economy. Only small parties and few independent deputies argue for the 
return to state-led development and related social security arrangements. 
However, the armed forces clearly defend a strong public sector, partly 
because they control a fair share of it, partly because they see it as a guarantee 
for national independence and sovereignty. At the same time, they defend the 
merits of the old social contract which, in their eyes, seems to guarantee social 
cohesion and therefore strengthen national independence even further.  
Unfortunately, in Tunisia and in Egypt, the translation of inputs into 
outputs and the design and implementation of policies as means to attain 
specific objectives will not overnight benefit from major efficiency gains 
simply because the political regimes have begun to change. Administrations 
still lack capacity in terms of human, organizational and other resources, with 
the exception of some privileged ministries and economically relevant state 
agencies. Moreover, some parts of the administration may continue to be 
dominated by remnants of the old regime and drag their feet. Even improved 
accountability will not immediately remove corruption. More generally, state 
agencies are not sufficiently insulated from society for their agents to be 
immune against family and other loyalties. In both countries, major long-term 
efforts will be needed to build capacity and upgrade state agencies in ways that 
simultaneously strengthen democratic government.  
Mutatis mutandis, the future of governance in the other Arab states is likely to 
be shaped by the very factors discussed for Tunisia and Egypt. Clearly, 
increasing diversity of inputs will only affect policy-making in countries where 
mechanisms of representation and even more so mechanisms of participation 
are being strengthened. At the moment, this is the case in Morocco, to a lesser 
extent in Jordan, and still in largely informal ways in Libya. In the three 
countries the weakness of civil society organizations will limit their impact on 
policy-making. However, in all countries governance will to various degrees 
suffer from the institutional deficiencies already described: weak state capacity 
in terms of human, organizational and material resources, lack of insulation of 
state agencies from society, divided loyalties of civil servants and other state 
employees that result from such lack of insulation, and low levels of 
accountability.  
Conditions are particularly grim in Libya where the new, potentially more 
participatory regime disposes of hardly any administrative capacity that would 
enable it to process inputs into policies and implement them. The combined 
effects of erratic rule, the resource curse, and recent violent domestic conflict 
have destroyed whatever administrative capacity once existed in the country. 
Even a committed government will need time to address these issues; they will 
only be settled within the broader context of successful state-building efforts 
that probably have to start from scratch.  
In Yemen and Syria the current political impasse limits diversity on the input 
side even more so than was the case before. If the opposition is crushed, 
policy-making is likely to continue as before the uprisings, except for some 
limited technical improvements in state capacity; if the regime collapses, 
governance will probably face the same challenges as in Libya. In the case of a 
power-sharing agreement between the current rulers and the opposition, more 
diverse inputs will still be processed and policies will still be implemented by 
highly deficient institutions.  
In the GCC states and in Algeria the absence of major regime 
transformations are likely to contribute to the continuity of processes of 
policy-making and implementation as far their institutional workings are 
concerned. Greater financial resources than in countries without significant oil 
and gas rents will enable governments to address the material dimensions of 
institutional deficiencies. However, the effects of authoritarian rule are likely 
to cast their shadow over other aspects of institutional reform, in particular 
accountability; even improvements to organizational structures and in the area 
of human resources are likely to collide with some aspects of authoritarian 
rule. Nor will prevailing patrimonial aspects of the exercise of power help to 
enhance the insulation of state agencies to the point that bureaucratic logics 
would dominate decision-making and the implementation of policies. In some 
countries, selective and limited political decompression may moderately 
 diversify inputs and thereby affect outputs. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, the 
extension of suffrage in municipal elections to women might force local 
councils to cater to new types of demands.  
In all countries, policy objectives and content will obviously (continue to) 
reflect domestic balances of power as well as the impact of external 
constraints. Independently thereof, remaining authoritarian regimes are likely 
to try and maintain increases in social spending decided after the beginnings of 
the protests in Tunisia or to increase such spending even further. While not 
necessarily convinced that the protests were primarily prompted by material 
concerns and grievances, these authoritarian leaders think that policy 
adjustments are their best bet in avoiding broader political reforms that could 
push them down the slippery slope of democratization. Though disposing of 
mechanisms to absorb and deflect popular grievances, the monarchies of 
Morocco and Jordan are likely to make or confirm similar policy choices in 
order to reduce the potential of further and possibly larger trouble. While all 
governments will have to worry about output legitimacy, those with little input 
legitimacy are likely to emphasize it most, partly to compensate for the latter, 
partly because they cannot rely on free elections and opinion polls to get a 
clear and detailed picture of the concerns of their subjects. As long as 
sufficient financial resources are available, general, inclusive, non-targeted 
disbursements that reach as many people as possible seem to be a viable 
insurance policy that even lack of administrative capacity cannot easily defeat.  
Additional welfare spending may, for the time being, ensure the survival of 
the incumbents and the resilience of the regimes. In actual practice, such 
upgrading of co-optation seems to go hand-in-hand with the search for 
additional legitimacy through a degree of political decompression and 
continued repression if the new red lines are transgressed. The solution may 
nonetheless reach its limits when expanding welfare provision and increasing 
expectations collide with growing populations or a decline in revenues caused 
by the vicissitudes of the energy market. 
With regard to policy-making and governance, capacity issues in the broader 
sense will remain a key challenge to all regimes, new and old. Though partly 
exacerbated by authoritarian rule, these issues affect non-authoritarian regimes 
as well whose ability to formulate more responsive policies needs to be 
matched by a similar ability to implement them. Aspects such as the paucity of 
intellectual and public debate, limited administrative capacities in terms of 
human, material and organizational resources, the insufficient insulation of 
state agencies from society and resulting conflicts of loyalty among their staff 
are common features in the countries of the so-called global south. In these 
states, dynamics of state- and nation-building have been less successful in 
producing Weberian bureaucracies than those observed in Western Europe 
and North America. These limitations are particularly strong in Libya, Syria 
and Yemen, but they are also clearly visible in the more consolidated states like 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. In that sense, approaching the nation-state 
model does not necessarily involve sharing all the features commonly 
associated with that model. Ultimately related to the history of state formation 
outside the historical heartlands of capitalist development, these deficiencies 
are among the defining features of the so-called periphery. To date, they are 
manifest in all Arab states, whether authoritarian or more participatory in 
nature. The member states of the GCC and major oil producers more 
generally may differ from the others in terms of per capita income and 
imported technology but not in terms of history, social structure and related 
sub-state solidarities and loyalties. Traditional, largely technical, capacity-
building measures dear to development agencies will only entail limited 
improvements. Whether specific sanctions and incentives can replace long-
term historical processes related to successful state- and nation-building 
remains to be seen. 
In light of these considerations, the prospects for the emergence and 
ultimate consolidation of a new, more participatory political regime, and 
possibly a fully fledged democracy, are best in Tunisia and not all too bad in 
 Egypt. Both are historically consolidated states which their inhabitants accept 
as legitimate entities and political arenas within which they can articulate and 
defend their demands. Prospects are less promising in Egypt largely because of 
the important role that the armed forces have carved out for themselves and 
continue to play in politics. Most likely it will take time for Egypt to overcome 
the limitations of a deficient democracy. In Morocco, regime transformation is 
facilitated by the historical consolidation of the state but simultaneously 
constrained by the representative aspects of the monarchy which ultimately 
favor regime resilience through authoritarian upgrading. In Jordan, the 
representative aspects of the monarchy, though less developed than in 
Morocco, pose all the more constraints to large-scale regime transformation as 
the state is also less consolidated historically. While Morocco has certain 
attributes of the nation-state, Jordan clearly remains a territorial state. In the 
other states of the latter type the emergence of new political orders face even 
greater uncertainties. In Libya, the demise of the ancien régime still allows for 
a variety of scenarios to unfold. In Syria and Yemen, the authoritarian rulers 
are still clinging on. In the absence of significant contestation, regime 
transformation in most of the hydrocarbon monarchies in the Gulf and in 
Algeria will probably be limited to partly prophylactic window dressing. 
However, not even the repression of the protests in Bahrain will guarantee 
that the Gulf states will remain calm and quiet forever. Like in Tunisia and 
Egypt, Tocquevillian dynamics of change may at some point encourage social 
climbers to challenge the old order; Kuwait may already be on that path. 
However, even then, future change will not necessarily be substantial enough 
to transform the events of the past 15 months into fully fledged revolutions or 
transitions to democracy. By implication, governance in general will continue 
to suffer from limited participation on the input side. At the same time, 
capacity issues largely unrelated to the authoritarian, democratic or hybrid 
nature of the political regimes will continue to affect – and bedevil  – policies 
on the output side. 
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 In January and February 2012, thousands of people gathered in cities across 
Tunisia and Egypt to remember the fall of Tunisian President Zinedine Ben 
Ali and his former Egyptian counterpart, Hosni Mubarak, on January 14, 2011 
and February 11, 2011 respectively. While the peaceful demonstrations in 
Tunisia were marked by pride and joy at the removal of one of the world’s 
worst totalitarian regimes, they were also an expression of many Tunisians’ 
concerns about ongoing socioeconomic problems and the dramatic rise in 
unemployment since the Jasmine Revolution early last year. In Egypt, on the 
other hand, regular violent attacks on peaceful protesters carried out by 
Egyptian security forces are chiefly a reflection of uncertainty about future 
political development. And even though the first anniversary of the Egyptian 
uprising was marked by the lifting of the 31-year-old state of emergency and 
the inaugural session of the first freely-elected parliament, military rule 
continues its decades-long hold on the country. A similar state of affairs 
prevails in Algeria, where the political and military elite has, until now at least, 
proved immune to the oft-cited “North African liberalization virus,” despite 
lifting emergency laws which have been in place since the early 1990s. As for 
the rest of the southern Mediterranean area, post-revolutionary Libya is 
currently involved in a complex process of nation-building and Syria has long 
since crossed the threshold to civil war, whereas the monarchical regimes of 
the two electoral dictatorships, Morocco and Jordan, have managed to 
negotiate a path between political reform and maintaining their monopoly on 
power. 
Shortly after the anniversaries of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, March 
8, 2012 marked one year since the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared 
Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” was unveiled amid much 
euphoria by the European Commission and the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. At the time, Ashton 
declared that the EU “has the experience and tools to help the countries in the 
region as they make the journey to deep democracy,” but since then the 
partnership – partly in response to pressure from the governments of those 
EU member states that see themselves as advocates of the 2008 Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) – has converged with the almost identical framework 
document which also relates to the EU’s eastern and southern neighbors, 
published on May 25, 2011 under the title “A New Response to a Changing 
Neighborhood.” This document has since constituted the EU’s strategic 
response to political developments among Europe’s southern neighbors. It 
provides the political framework for the EU’s foreign policy initiatives. With 
reference to the centrality of this document, this author will lay out the most 
relevant fundamental amendments to the revised, “new” European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP). I will then offer a critical overview of the EU’s 
reaction to the upheaval in the Maghreb and the Mashriq, frequently referred 
to as the “Arab Spring,” and its associated challenges. Finally, in light of the 
findings of the BTI 2012, various socioeconomic sectors will be shown in 
perspective, sectors which are of central importance to the sustained success 
of partially implemented political and economic transition processes in the 
southern Mediterranean area, and in which the EU has the capacity and scope 
for. 
The priority areas of the supposedly “new” ENP are essentially a remake of 
the original neighborhood policy, widely regarded as unsuccessful by experts, 
which was launched in 2003 with the publication of the original “Wider 
Europe” document, drawn up by the European Commission (hereafter the 
“Commission”). Incorporating much of the old ENP – promotion and 
support of democratic transformation processes, establishment and reform of 
efficient institutions, strengthening of basic law and human rights, anchoring 
of good governance, reform of the judiciary, battling corruption as well as 
supporting sustainable socioeconomic development, accompanied by 
 economic modernization as well as integration in the global economic system 
– this document is once again based on the “more for more” principle. In 
other words, the more governments in neighboring southern Mediterranean 
countries implement reforms in the sectors outlined in the EU strategy paper, 
the more assistance the EU will offer. At the same time, and this is the central 
innovation of the revised neighborhood policy, the EU indicates more clearly 
than ever before that it will restructure or even reduce support for those 
regimes which delay, impede or prematurely abort reform plans. The “more 
for more” policy based on positive conditionality already represents the 
cornerstone of the “old” ENP, not least in light of the offer of “everything 
but institutions” made by then Commission President Romano Prodi. The 
emphatic reference to “less for less” indicates on the other hand a greater 
determination on the part of the EU to sanction aberrant, that is, anti-reform 
behavior, instead of mutely accepting it. Consequently the EU is threatening 
that where there is less reform, it will provide less financial aid and sectoral 
support. 
The revision of the ENP is partly based on the realization that since 2003, 
regimes in the southern Mediterranean neighbor states responded in widely 
differing ways to the partnership offered to them under the 1995 Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which was more or less free of such 
conditions. The ruling elite in Syria and Lebanon, for instance, were largely 
indifferent and involved their regional neighbors Algeria and Egypt in the 
cooperation mechanisms it presented, merely on an occasional, case-by-case 
basis and as a result of pragmatic cost-benefit analysis. This contrasts with the 
governing elites in Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia who – although in differing 
political fields – demonstrated a greater willingness to cooperate and even 
reform, which nonetheless failed to result in the creation of far-reaching 
democratic structures and political systems. Consequently there were 
widespread expectations that the revised ENP would take into account these 
differing cooperation behaviors and henceforth incorporate mechanisms 
which allow the EU to respond flexibly and on a case-specific basis to varying 
degrees of cooperation and reform and thus progress towards democracy. 
In the last 13 months, EU Commissioner Füle and the High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, have repeatedly 
stressed that the “new” ENP represents the EU’s strategic response to the 
Arab Spring. Even in the face of the failure of other responses and the fully 
implemented adaptation of individual elements of the “old” ENP to political 
developments, particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, such statements cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. But they only partially correspond to political realities. 
For one thing, the revision of the ENP was already decided in the second half 
of 2010, thus at a time when the EU and the regime of then Tunisian 
President Ben Ali were in the final phase of bilateral negotiations to award 
Tunisia “advanced status,” and Arab rebellion wasn’t even a theoretical 
consideration among planning staff in the Brussels institutions. What’s more, 
both the May 25, 2011 strategy paper and the March 8, 2011 report from the 
Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) dealing 
exclusively with the Mediterranean area read more like blueprints for an 
assistance program concentrating on economic and humanitarian aid than a 
coherent and clearly defined program designed to promote external 
democracy. 
It’s therefore hardly surprising that in its new document policy, the EU 
proceeds from the assumption that governments in the southern 
Mediterranean area are ready to embark on a path of reform accompanied or 
even initiated by outside forces, as they did in the context of the original ENP 
which came into effect in 2003. However, the revised ENP fails to 
acknowledge the well-documented fact that in recent decades, not one (Arab) 
regime has been motivated to implement and maintain a sustainable process of 
political liberalization as a result of external, non-military pressure. 
Furthermore, the EU seems to have a limited awareness of the complexity of 
current transition processes as well as the associated societal protests whose 
form varies greatly from country to country (see Eberhard Kienle’s 
contribution in this edition). The strategy paper offers generalizations 
accompanied by a tendentious and unjustified transfer of the Tunisian 
development path to other countries in the region which are still 
overwhelmingly characterized by authoritarian structures. Moreover, within 
the same document relevant terms such as democratization, transition and 
democratic transformation are used in the same interchangeable and ill-
defined manner as concepts like democracy, rule of law, governance reform 
and the need to strengthen human and civil rights. The “new” ENP therefore 
 stands in the tradition of bilateral action plans up to the present day which are 
also marked by these characteristics, representing nothing more than a vague 
and incomplete catalog of reforms. There are two additional aspects. 
Firstly, even though the EU implicitly acknowledges the continued existence 
of authoritarian regimes with reference to the “less for less” principle and in 
its rhetoric, at least, threatens to take a different approach, the May 25, 2011 
strategy paper merely alludes to “other political measures” without identifying 
them, apart from the vague mention of “targeted sanctions.” Therefore, the 
revised ENP must be seen as an expression of the EU’s inability to exert 
effective influence on authoritarian regimes to establish and maintain 
democratic reforms, as long as this threat isn’t credibly substantiated by the 
appropriate political will. 
Secondly, the “new” ENP doesn’t devote a single word to the changed 
internal power structures in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Libya. Admittedly, 
free and fair parliamentary elections in the first three named countries only 
took place in late 2011 and thus after the official adoption of the “new” ENP. 
In light of the fact that transnational revolts were particularly targeted at the 
ruling parties which had been in power for decades, and that the success of 
Islamic parties stood out early on, such an omission is inexplicable. It is, in 
fact, problematic. Not just because Islamic movements now represent the 
governing majority in all three states, but rather because the associated long-
simmering conflict between secular and religious movements and currents in 
the Arab Mediterranean states has now come to the light of day, visible even 
to external observers such as the EU, and providing a lasting solution to this 
issue is the first and central condition for political consolidation. 
The ENP and the failure of a strategic long-term goal 
Enshrining the effective simultaneity of the “more for more” and the “less 
for less” approaches in policy cannot disguise the fact that the revised ENP 
provides neither southern nor eastern neighbor states with an explicitly 
formulated, strategic long-term goal or a detailed roadmap for realizing it. 
Whether the principle of “more for more” can really achieve a leveraging 
effect and inspire reform as desired by the Commission and the EEAS is in 
turn more or less wholly dependent on prospects offered by neighboring 
states. Despite recent political developments in the southern Mediterranean 
area the EU has nonetheless refrained from defining this oft-cited conclusion 
of the EU European commitment to its neighbors either for itself or for its 
governmental and non-governmental partners. Neither the May 25, 2011 
strategy paper, nor Article 8 of the Lisbon Treaty is useful in this respect. 
Where the former fails to define the degree to which the “more for more” 
principle prevails over the principle of tailoring an approach according to the 
policy area in question, Article 8, which constitutionalizes neighboring states 
and the associated ENP, merely speaks of the EU’s aim of developing a 
“special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area 
of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union 
and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation.” 
Aside from the standardized phrasing of this paragraph and the fact that 
“neighboring countries” remains undefined as a geographical term, the terms 
used make clear that “special relationships” could potentially incorporate all 
issue areas and so achieve great depth. In any case, the references to “close 
relations” and “great depth” are not sufficient to concretize the offer of “more 
for more” and “everything but institutions,” as they do not set out what 
cooperation and integration prospects they might provide to the agents of 
reform in return for which implemented reforms. 
The ENP caught between insufficient differentiation and duplicity 
The logic of differentiation emphasized anew by Catherine Ashton and EU 
Commissioner Stefan Füle in May last year, which in any case already 
underpinned the 2003 ENP, has not proved effective in the EU’s negotiations 
following the Arab Spring nor, in fact, previously. In fact the contrary has 
generally been the case. Instead of considering the political, economic, 
socioeconomic, cultural and historic specifics and developments in each 
neighbor state and carrying out a policy to promote external democracy 
 customized and tailored to requirements as well as national, regional and local 
conditions, since the 2003 ENP the EU has instead pursued a “one size fits 
all” policy and stuck to this approach – despite declarations to the contrary – 
since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. With their oft-mentioned vagueness, 
individual, bilateral action plans may accentuate fundamentally different policy 
areas and call for partly differentiated reform efforts at the micro level. 
However since spring 2011, the EU continues to rely on the same instruments 
as well as the same incentive programs, regardless of whether they are 
attractive to the recipient country. This applies, for example, to the recent 
offer of “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas” (DCFTA) whose 
structural distinctions from previously agreed Euro-Mediterranean free trade 
agreements remains to be explained by the Commission and which in any case 
were also offered to partner countries of the eastern partnership. It also 
applies to the agreements signed in recent years, at least by individual EU 
member states and southern Mediterranean states, over readmission of illegal 
immigrants. Although both types of agreement have proved cost-intensive 
over the years from the point of view of the relevant neighboring countries, 
and have in fact generated negative socioeconomic consequences, the EU, 
which is almost exclusively interested in such agreements, ascribes model 
characteristics to this approach in the context of its revised ENP. The EU 
extols it as the central component of the “more for more” approach and so 
effectively invalidates the principle of differentiation which was supposed to 
rely on the specificity of each case and promote targeted utilization. That the 
EU claims to pursue positive and differentiated conditionality according to 
normative premises, but is instead clearly calculating primarily in accordance 
with its own interests, independent of the respective conditions in partner 
countries, serves to confirm accusations of duplicity leveled against the ENP 
over the years.  
This aspect relates directly to the question of the attractiveness of the 
incentives which are apparently being offered. The EU assumes that Arab 
and/or North African regimes value putative rewards for political and 
economic reforms, that is, a vague offer of gradual integration into the EU 
single market, more highly than the costs that would arise from adaptation to, 
and adoption of the acquis communautaire. This assumption was confirmed, for 
example, by the signing of the Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement with 
Morocco in December 2010 and the parallel gradual integration of the country 
into EU-European regulations, long sought by the Moroccan regime. In any 
case the agreement, which is advantageous to both parties in competitive and 
technical terms, hasn’t led to any noteworthy reform projects in accordance 
with the applicable ENP action plan. Nor did the runup to the signing of the 
agreement bring any change in Morocco’s disregard for political and human 
rights, adherence to which is one of the concrete preconditions for EU 
“rewards.” In other words, the EU has put aside the “more for more” 
principle, as it has in numerous other instances, instead of reacting to the lack 
of reforms and the ongoing abuse of human rights in Morocco by resorting to 
negative conditionality as required. This precedent means that it will no longer 
be safe to assume that autocratic regimes in the southern Mediterranean area 
will be motivated to more reforms because of the “new” ENP, and thus 
commit to less authoritarian practices. Conversely, this is accompanied by an 
awareness that the “less for less principle” propagated since mid-2011 in 
practice embodies nothing other than the negative conditionality anchored in 
every Euro-Mediterranean agreement – and ignored by the EU for years – 
representing no real threat to reform-averse regimes and remaining, of 
necessity almost, an ineffective instrument for promoting external democracy. 
The ENP caught between integration and fragmentation 
The application of the principle of positive conditionality, in place since 
2003, which was reinforced in 2011 by the “more for more” approach, 
essentially raises the possibility that reformist neighboring countries will 
become involved in a process of gradual, sectorial and policy field-specific 
integration in parts of the EU’s regulatory framework and so gain access to the 
EU single market. Such a process could very well lead to convergence between 
the EU and the respective country in the relevant policy area and an 
accompanying harmonization of its national body of law with the acquis 
communautaire, that is, common vested rights. The Euro-Mediterranean 
Aviation Agreement signed with Morocco in 2010 serves once again as a vivid 
example in this context.  
But such a scenario only reflects the best-case scenario. Those countries 
whose regimes are not ready to cooperate with the EU’s “more for more” 
 approach and at the same time reject far-reaching and sustainable political 
reforms – Algeria, for instance – generally end up even further behind, at least 
in their democratic development, than those neighboring countries whose 
ruling elites display a greater willingness to reform. From the EU’s point of 
view, this is then linked to the consequence that the rejection of 
transformation among southern partners means that the ongoing watering 
down of sector-specific external EU borders which are an inevitable by-
product of neighboring regimes’ convergence process with parts of the 
common vested rights will be accompanied by further fragmentation in the 
Mediterranean area in the policy field of “rule.” In other words: even the 
“new” ENP can scarcely prevent an already disparate and until now diffuse 
picture of democratic development in the Maghreb and Mashriq being 
overlaid by a sharper image of regression, or even a return to authoritarian 
rule. 
If the EU must proceed from the assumption that its southern 
Mediterranean neighbors still contain reform-averse regimes among their 
number, who respond insufficiently or not at all to external pressure or 
external offers and incentives to reform and thus endanger the goal of a Euro-
Mediterranean area based on democratic principles, the question inevitably 
arises: how prepared is the ENP to cope with these challenges? This also 
incorporates the question, how consistent are conceptions of usage of the 
“less for less” principle within the EU? And: how should one approach the 
policy field of “security” and associated fields like energy security and 
migration in such a context? An especially relevant question when one 
considers that pursuit of its own vital interests in these fields has brought the 
EU to a relationship of purely negative, asymmetrical interdependence with 
authoritarian regimes. 
The ENP in light of the EU’s internal conflicts of interest 
Almost one year after the publication of the revised ENP, it is already clear 
that prevailing conflicts of interest both between and within individual EU 
institutions, which had already hampered the original 2003 ENP and the 1995 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also affect the credibility of the 
revised ENP. While the Foreign Affairs Council, the EEAS and the 
Commission are essentially united in agreement on normative goal setting in 
support of southern Mediterranean societies’ quest for democracy, rule of law 
as well as consolidation of human rights, there is no agreement either within 
the respective EU institutions or between the three about how these goals 
should actually be implemented. In Egypt, for example, the ongoing abuse of 
human rights resulting from continued de facto rule by the military (see 
contribution by Kienle in this publication) should, strictly speaking, result in a 
targeted reduction of EU support in line with the “less for less” principle. 
Nevertheless, undistinguished and watered-down declarations which simply 
demand Egyptian authorities refrain from using violence and ensure human 
rights and civil liberties are in harmony with international standards, are 
nothing but the lowest – and least effective – common denominator to which 
the governments of the EU member states can agree between themselves and 
with the Commission and the EEAS. So instead of evoking the principle of 
negative conditionality in compliance with the May 25, 2011 strategy paper, 
based on the gravity of the breach of the relevant association agreement or 
action plan, the loose coalition led by France and Spain which prioritizes usage 
of the “more for more” principle, in contrast to some northern European 
member states and sections of the European Parliament, has prevailed within 
the EU since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. This development is reflected 
in the mandate to resume negotiations with the Egyptian government over the 
DCFTA in the spirit of the association agreement of 2004, given by the 
Foreign Affairs Council to the Commission on December 14, 2011. Even 
though it was accompanied by an accurate reference to the country’s ongoing 
democratic and economic reform process, it ignored the military’s persistent 
blockage of democratic reforms. 
Even the passages that deal directly or indirectly with the policy field of 
“security” are problematic in that the EU – as seen already in the context of 
the EMP and the original ENP – fails either to define security or to explain 
the conception of security that should underpin the closer political and 
security partnership being offered once more. This is especially worth 
 emphasizing in light of the EU’s self-imposed demand for increased 
engagement in conflicts in its immediate neighborhood. And given that the 
logic of “more for more” has effectively represented one of the major 
foundations of the EU’s external governance efforts in the southern 
Mediterranean area, it is difficult to assume that emphasizing it again as part of 
the “new” ENP will lead to a change in the conflict behaviors of southern 
Mediterranean regimes or to a more influential and lasting role for the EU in 
solving territorial conflicts. Leaving aside the fact that territorial conflicts in 
the southern Mediterranean area are exploited by regimes for domestic 
purposes and that they represent potential instruments of power to shore up 
their legitimacy, in its revision of the ENP the EU has once again failed to 
directly link conflict resolution to the provision of explicitly formulated 
incentive or reward systems, arranged according to the particular geopolitical 
sensitivities and security needs of all participants in regional conflicts. This 
stands in blatant contrast to the Commission and EEAS’s affirmatively 
formulated call for the ENP to be used as a means to stronger, more 
confident engagement in conflict management and resolution. 
Bilateral political and security policy dialogue with regimes in the southern 
Mediterranean under the EMP was already – apart from negative spillovers 
from the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict – hampered by a conceptual 
imbalance, distinguished above all by the fact that security in the southern 
Mediterranean remained first and foremost territorially defined, unilaterally 
organized, and marked by an absence of partnership-building measures. Aside 
from Europe’s security concept, gradually deepening and built on multilateral 
relations and interdependence, the “new” ENP seems to at least implicitly 
confront this otherness with its rejection of a wide conception of security, 
covered in the context of topics such as climate change, non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, cross-border criminality, 
the drug trade, illegal migration, and energy and resource security. 
The ENP and energy security 
In terms of energy and resource security, the “new” ENP appears quite 
ambitious at first glance. Both the Commission and the EEAS discuss the 
prospect of institutionalizing an energy policy dialogue in the future, which 
along with the development of partnerships in the areas of renewable energy, 
energy efficiency and nuclear security also allows for the market integration of 
those neighboring states considered important by the EU in the area of gas 
and oil export (Algeria, Libya) as well as solar energy (Morocco, Tunisia). 
Whereas the EU and almost all countries in the southern Mediterranean area 
find themselves in relations of mutual dependency and mutual potential 
advantage in establishing facilities to produce and exploit renewable energy, an 
early example of which is the energy partnership of the EU-supported 
Desertec project in the Maghreb, the situation is different in the field of classic 
hydrocarbons. Here the EU, gradually implementing energy supplier 
diversification, is in a position of asymmetrical interdependence, its member 
states depending more on imports of Algerian and Libyan natural gas and oil 
than those supplier nations, with increasing commercial ties with the United 
States and China, depend on the EU. Consequently it can be assumed that the 
area of energy security does not come under the scope of the “less for less” 
approach. On the one hand this is understandable in light of the 
interdependence described earlier. On the other hand, it is exactly the type of 
exception-based practice that casts doubt on the “new” ENP’s credibility and 
thus also on the EU’s determination, so often cited in the last 12 months, to 
make consistent use of the “less for less” concept. The example of Algeria, 
where hydrocarbon products represent 98 per of exports, and which is the 
EU’s 13th most significant import partner, makes it clear that even under the 
“new” ENP the EU’s foreign policy objectives, almost of necessity normative, 
will remain subordinate to vital foreign trade interests, formulated under the 
banner of promoting democracy abroad. At the height of the Arab Spring and 
to this day, both the Commission and the EEAS have exercised restraint in 
their assessment of domestic political developments in Algeria and the 
perennial disregard for political and human rights displayed by the country’s 
security forces. In fact, the Commission granted the authoritarian and reform-
averse Algerian regime financial support to the amount of €34.5 million as well 
as €23.5 million to support programs in the areas of cultural heritage, 
transportation and job market development in the second half of 2011 in what 
amounts to a “more for less” arrangement. It has done so while emphasizing 
the need for deeper bilateral cooperation, not least to protect external 
economic interests and thus, in the widest sense, security policy interests. 
 The ENP and migration 
A similar assessment applies to the EU’s call for deeper cooperation to 
handle waves of illegal migration. Although of only limited significance for 
security policy, migration was mainly mentioned in the May 25, 2011 strategy 
paper in tandem with the establishment of as-yet-undefined mobility 
partnerships and security policy considerations. Given that the EU also finds 
itself in a relationship of asymmetrical interdependence with sending or transit 
countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, and that it is virtually dependent on 
the cooperation of authorities in both countries, the deepening of bilateral 
dialogue mechanisms as well as cost-intensive supply of expertise and 
materials in the context of the EU’s oft-cited integrated border management 
seems detached from reform progress in other policy areas. Regardless of the 
fact that the policy area of migration is increasingly characterized as a security 
issue, as can be observed in Euro-Mediterranean relations since 2005 and the 
process of outsourcing border controls driven by the EU that has been 
underway for years, this means in end effect that a potential application of the 
“less for less” principle which forms the basis of the “new” ENP within the 
policy field of migration is largely irrelevant from the standpoint of southern 
Mediterranean neighbor states, and from the EU’s standpoint it might even be 
counterproductive in terms of managing its border regime. Consequently the 
“new” ENP is not suitable for applying positive or negative conditionality in 
this sector or in any aspect of bilateral action plans relating to migration. 
Although the state of economic transformation in all Arab Mediterranean 
neighbor states has improved in the four-year period from 2008 to 2012, with 
the exception – as the BTI 2012 makes clear – of Tunisia and Jordan, and 
management services have experienced a modest upswing at least in Algeria, 
Egypt and Syria, the Arab states of the southern Mediterranean area are still 
marked by massive deficits in terms of democratic developments as well as 
politico-economic structural deficiencies (see Jan Völkel’s contribution in this 
edition). True, the “new” ENP deals with this situation but as demonstrated in 
this chapter, its implementation is hampered by a variety of inherent structural 
weaknesses and contradictions. While these are especially evident in the area 
of political transformation, it raises the question of whether the EU and its 
member states regard the evidently undifferentiated application of a “less for 
less” approach as generally helpful, in light of the problematic socioeconomic 
situation in almost all Arab Mediterranean neighboring states that triggered the 
2011 revolts in the first place. Given that reduction or cancellation of external 
support measures negatively impacts the policy field of “welfare” first of all, a 
field already underdeveloped in neighboring states, in implementing the “new” 
ENP it is worth considering the option of partially detaching it from the 
policy area of “rule” and instead concentrating on promoting those economic 
and social sectors that are most affected by the structural deficiencies 
described in the BTI 2012.  
It could be argued that such a practice stretches the logic of incentive-based 
bilateral relations ad absurdum. Such an accusation must be countered with 
the durability and consequent prospects for success of political reforms and 
democratic transformation, particularly in Tunisia but also in Egypt. After all, 
the success of these reforms is inextricably linked to improving the micro- and 
macroeconomic situation and thus a noticeable improvement in individual 
living conditions. Furthermore, support which has no basis in negative 
conditionality does not necessarily have to apply to all policy fields. The logic 
of both “more for more” and “less for less” can be evoked, if both are applied 
in parallel by the EU, at least in those sectors in which reforms primarily affect 
the power monopoly of the ruling authoritarian regime and its abuse of that 
power. To put it plainly: retaining the normative core of the ENP and 
maintaining a minimum scope for foreign policy action and influence means 
that the area of “rule” must be distinguished from the socioeconomic/ 
humanitarian area. In the area of “rule,” “double” conditionality should be 
maintained, subject to those vital interests that from the EU’s point of view 
must be considered, even when there is little cause for optimism as to its 
effectiveness, as this article shows. But coordination with other external agents 
in each field of cooperation is also vitally important in such an approach, to 
generate greater scope for action, wider social acceptance and consequently 
synergy and sustainability effects. It is especially worth mentioning Turkey 
here, as it serves an exemplary function for large sections of southern 
 Mediterranean society due to its social model based on an apparent synthesis 
of democratic and religious values, its participation in the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) and its systematic building of economic relations in the 
Middle East and North Africa in recent years. The member states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council could also prove useful in the Maghreb and Mashriq, 
their engagement having systematically increased in the last twelve years, not 
least in complementing supply of capital with sector-relevant expertise and 
minimizing duplication. 
Finally, therefore, I will outline five areas in which the “new” ENP, in 
addition to the sectors it already targets, should provide active and non-
bureaucratic support. This is recommended for creating further scope for 
action to allow the relevant agents of political reform to concentrate on 
implementing political reform, at the same time preventing potential veto 
players who may exploit socioeconomic hardship and torpedo those 
transformation processes already underway. Although the ENP is based on 
the principle of differentiation, its application is dispensable in the following 
areas, as the basic characteristics are alike in all Arab Mediterranean 
neighboring states:  
• Common to all Arab Mediterranean neighbor states is that they suffer under 
enormous economic differences. North-South differences are joined by 
East-West as well as urban-rural differences. These contrasts are one of the 
reasons that not all citizens have been able to profit to the same extent from 
the impressive economic growth rates of recent years. With enthusiastic 
support from foreign investors and financial support from the EU, regimes 
have pursued a course of economic modernization that all too often 
concentrates on the coastal regions dominated by the tourism industry – as 
seen in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt – thus neglecting agrarian interior 
regions suffering from water shortage. Reducing these contrasts and 
eliminating them altogether in the medium term is therefore a challenge to 
which the “new” ENP must rise if it wants to fulfill its self-imposed holistic 
demands and break with support practices that have all too often run out of 
steam in the past. 
• This is accompanied by a need to reduce the dependence of almost all 
southern Mediterranean societies on the rural sector as well as dependence 
on food imports and contribute to macroeconomic diversification. 
Agriculture employs a large proportion of the region’s working population 
(50% in Morocco, for instance) and represents a significant portion of the 
GDP (between 10% and 15% in Morocco, depending on harvests). At the 
same time, high dependency on food imports (around 70% in Algeria) 
greatly reduces each government’s scope for socioeconomic action. In light 
of its most recent eastern expansion the EU has relevant experience in this 
area and given the ambitious objective of integrating southern 
Mediterranean neighboring states in global economic structures as 
formulated in the “new” ENP, it is obliged to contribute. 
• These issues are also reinforced by the fact that the EU’s agricultural 
imports from southern Mediterranean states are still hampered by non-tariff 
barriers that disadvantage precisely the product categories in which 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and to a lesser extent Lebanon and Jordan have 
considerable competitive advantages. Given that a key platform of the 
“new” ENP is the launch of the DCFTAs, there is currently a concrete 
opportunity to move away from the asymmetrical free trade practices of 
recent years and at the same time complement the hub-and-spoke approach 
that forms the basis of this practice, which only provides for bilateral trade 
agreements on a horizontal basis, with the establishment or strengthening of 
vertical, intraregional and interregional free trade pacts to finally make use of 
the regional convention regarding preferential pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules 
of origin. 
• Similarly underdeveloped in the Maghreb and Mashriq is a national and 
consequently transnational transport infrastructure, which greatly 
complicates mobility within societies as well as the deepening of regional or 
sub-regional cooperation and integration structures as embodied, for 
instance, in the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) or the 2004 Agadir 
Agreement. In this area especially the “new” ENP offers possible 
approaches and lines of communication with the UfM, which explicitly 
prescribes project-specific cooperation in the area of infrastructure, among 
others. Along with the chance it offers to pull the UfM out of the evident 
stagnation into which it has sunk since its establishment in 2008, and to 
unite both cooperation structures in the spirit of the coherence requirement, 
 this further opens up a chance for the EU to contribute in a complementary 
manner to the success of national infrastructure programs, such as those 
already underway in Algeria (as part of the national five year plan), and in 
Morocco. 
• Health care has also been on the periphery of national and international 
development priorities in almost all southern Mediterranean neighbor states 
for years, despite numerous partnership initiatives and different policy 
approaches. Whereas Germany, for example, has a doctor-patient ratio of 
around 3.7 per 1000 inhabitants, the three states of the inner Maghreb are 
particularly marked by poor medical care. The ratio in Algeria is 0.9 doctors 
per 1000 inhabitants, in Tunisia it is 0.8 and in Morocco just 0.5. Despite 
this starting point, which can be described as precarious from a 
development policy point of view, the May 25, 2011 strategy paper makes 
no mention of these problems apart from a marginal note, and therefore 
underestimates the integral links between development of society as a whole, 
socioeconomic modernization and the existence of a readily accessible and 
functioning health system. In the Maghreb the Algerian regime, for instance, 
is currently rethinking this issue and has promised to use a portion of oil 
profits to build 60 hospitals. While the EU discerns an opportunity to assist 
this process in an advisory and support capacity, with recourse to the 
TAIEX program, it is obliged from a humanitarian standpoint to push for 
the implementation of similar measures in Morocco and Tunisia, 
cooperating with each country’s newly elected government and leaving aside 
considerations of positive or negative conditionality. 
Admittedly, many of these policy areas have been thoroughly discussed by 
the EU in recent months and both the March 8 and May 25 strategy papers 
have been afforded priority. However, the EU has so far failed to back up its 
rhetoric with active, decisive and credible action or to detach some selected 
policy fields, such as the five final areas laid out here, from the principle of 
double conditionality. Beyond this urgent need, which in the widest sense can 
be interpreted as a measure to promote democracy from abroad, it should be 
noted that the simultaneity of the principles of “more for more” and “less for 
less” introduced by the “new” ENP generates more problems and 
contradictions without necessarily generating greater influence over local 
transition processes. Consequently the “new” ENP seems unsuitable as the 
sole agent for the implementation or support of democratic reforms and 
carries the risk of counteracting the normative objective which the EU has 
officially pursued since 1995, that of transforming the Euro-Mediterranean 
area into one of peace and prosperity built on democratic principles. 
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